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Abstract

Aberrant Salience and Probabilistic Reasoning in Distressing Attenuated Positive Psychotic
Symptoms: An Examination of a Two Factor Model
By Huw Green
Advisor: Deidre Anglin
Theoretical psychological models of positive psychotic symptoms have increasingly
emphasized the interaction of multiple cognitive factors. Research into delusions in particular
has focused on the interaction of two factors; a perceptual anomaly that gives rise to a need for
explanation, and a bias toward premature acceptance of a hypothesis. Recently this two factor
approach has been applied to positive psychotic symptoms more broadly. Two candidate factors
have received extensive theoretical and empirical interest. The aberrant salience hypothesis
posits that salience regulation, mediated by dopamine, goes awry in psychosis, giving rise to a
generalized sense of undue significance that is applied to neutral perceptual stimuli. For the
person who experiences it, this unwarranted sense of significance seems to demand an
explanation. A second candidate factor, the jumping to conclusions bias has come to be regarded
as one of the most stable findings in psychosis research. Reliably associated with the presence of
delusions, but also associated with positive symptoms more broadly, the bias is seen when
psychotic participants make a probabilistic decision on the basis of less evidence than controls.
These factors may work in concert to establish unrealistic conclusions about the nature of
perceptual inputs, giving rise to psychotic explanations. In a quasi-experimental study,
individuals who endorsed an unusually high level of distressing attenuated positive psychotic
symptoms (DAPPS) were compared with controls who endorse a lower than average number.
Participants completed one behavioral and one self-report measure of aberrant salience, and a
commonly used task for assessing the presence of bias in probabilistic reasoning.
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Results: Preliminary analyses revealed that participants in the current study did not
respond in the expected way to the behavioral measure of aberrant salience. It is possible that the
task used is insufficiently sensitive to detect subtle variations in salience processing among nonclinical individuals. In terms of the main results, multiple independent samples t-tests (corrected
for multiple comparisons) revealed a group difference only on the self-report measure of aberrant
salience. Groups showed no significant difference on the test of probabilistic reasoning, though
the group with elevated rates of DAPPS requested more evidence than controls. Logistic
regression models predicting group membership from the experimental variables suggested that
while the inclusion of aberrant salience significantly improved predictive accuracy, neither
probabilistic reasoning nor the interaction between aberrant salience and probabilistic reasoning
increased predictive accuracy. This result is a consistent with an interpretation on which
distressing attenuated positive psychotic symptoms are associated with aberrant salience
attribution but not with probabilistic reasoning deficits. Further research is needed to establish
whether these variables interact in clinical samples.
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Chapter 1: Introduction:
Psychotic disorders, during which people lose the capacity to distinguish their subjective
experiences from shared reality and experience symptoms including hallucinations, delusional
beliefs and disorganized thought, are potentially devastating and poorly understood1. Often
starting in late adolescence/early adulthood, they affect around 1% of the population, though this
figure has proved to be more variable across time and place than was conventionally believed
(Stilo and Murray, 2010). One approach to the investigation of psychosis that is increasingly
gaining traction is the study of the cognitive “pathways” that contribute to potentially distressing
psychological end state “positive symptoms” such as hearing voices or holding delusional beliefs
(e.g. McCarthy Jones, 2012; Freeman and Garety, 2014).
An attendant assumption of this literature is that there is no clear “cut-off” between
psychosis and “health”. Rather it is supposed that psychotic experiences lie on a continuum and
can be considered to some extent analogous with experiences that have been found among
healthy individuals (Meehl, 1962; Van Os et al. 2009). It is an implication of this assumption that
the study of individuals without a psychiatric diagnosis, but demonstrating elevated rates of
psychotic symptoms or “complaints” (Bentall et al., 1988), can inform our understanding of
“full-blown” psychotic states. Individuals exhibiting “at risk” mental states represent a
particularly promising population to study from this perspective (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013a).
The study of “at risk” states arose from the hope that early intervention could arrest the
development of psychosis and forestall its worst effects (McGlashan and Johannessen, 1996). A
The American Psychiatric Association defines psychotic disorders as follows: “They are defined by
abnormalities in one or more of the following five domains: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized
thinking (speech), grossly disorganized or abnormal motor behavior (including catatonia), and
negative symptoms.” (DSM-5, p.87)
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number of structured interview protocols (e.g. McGlashan et al., 2009) and self-report
questionnaires (e.g. Loewy et al., 2005) have been developed to assess for such states, and these
can predict conversion to a DSM/ICD psychotic disorder in around 32% of untreated cases after
three years (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013b)2. In addition to the benefits of identifying people early in a
posited neurodevelopmental process, the construct of an “at risk” state offers the possibility of
studying the psychological processes involved in psychosis, with greater confidence than that
offered by the study of “normal” samples differentiated by psychometric “proneness” measures
like the Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999) or the Launay Slade Hallucination
Scale (LSHS; Launay and Slade, 1981).
Unlike “at risk” diagnoses, which identify individuals who are more likely to develop
psychotic disorders (and who are frequently treatment seeking and experiencing significantly
lower levels of social functioning and quality of life, Fusar-Poli et al. 2015), measures of
proneness typically measure the prevalence of attenuated symptomatology in the healthy
population with no reference to how much interference or dysfunction the symptoms cause to the
individual who experiences them. Proneness is a broader category and tends to be defined in
reference to the characteristics of any given sample. Thus a fairly typical research design
examining psychosis proneness may administer the PDI or the LSHS to a sample of nontreatment-seeking individuals and then divide these into a prone and non-prone group on the
basis of a split into the upper and lower quartile. Otherwise, researchers may use responses on a
self-report measure to generate a continuous outcome variable. A difficulty with this approach is
that psychosis proneness is a hypothetical variable which cannot necessarily be considered to be
2

Though Fusar-Poli et al. (2013b) also note that the rates of conversion appear to have declined over time in
successive longitudinal studies, from a two year rate of around 45% in a 2004 study, to two year rate of around 10%
in a 2011 study. Although these studies do not compare treated and untreated groups, Fusar-Poli et al. suggest that
the change may be due to a greater availability of preventative interventions during the last decade.
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linked to clinically relevant psychotic symptoms. David (2010) addresses this and suggests it is
premature to assume that high scorers on, e.g. the PDI are on the same continuum as those who
experience clinically relevant psychosis. For this reason, the current study adopts an approach in
which participants are administered a self-report measure sensitive to both the presence of
attenuated positive psychotic symptoms and to the clinical “at risk” state.
In the next section I will introduce contemporary psychological approaches to psychosis.
A broad consensus of psychological researchers proposes that complex psychotic symptoms such
as delusional beliefs and hallucinations are best understood in terms of multiple factors (e.g.
Freeman, 2007). In an account of delusions offered by Coltheart et al. (2011), two factors in
particular, an anomalous perceptual experience and a faulty reasoning style, are accorded
significance. This two factor approach has recently been theoretically extended to a model
designed to account for all positive psychotic experiences, not just delusions (Moritz et al.,
2016). Specific candidate “factors” have been increasingly researched, and I will introduce two
of these, “aberrant salience” and the “jumping to conclusions” bias (JTC), along with the
growing empirical literature on their role in psychotic symptomatology. However, while the
empirical literature on these phenomena has grown, the majority of studies have treated them as
individual factors, and focused on ascertaining their presence in schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorders.
I will go on to outline ways that aberrant salience and the JTC bias might interact to
contribute to the early development of psychotic symptoms, suggesting that the two factor model
supports the hypothesis that neither candidate is sufficient for a full blown psychosis. In the
subsequent section I will propose an experimental procedure to examine how these variables

3

may be interacting in a group of individuals presenting with attenuated positive psychotic
symptoms (APPS).
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Chapter 2: Literature Review:

2.1 Continuum approaches to psychosis and high risk:
Since the mid-1980s (Bentall et al, 1988; Bentall, 2004), researchers have increasingly
advocated investigating cognitive models of risk for psychotic phenomena. This work has built
on the growing consensuses that psychological phenomena may be significant in the causal
pathways to psychotic experiences, and that there is no clear “cut off” between people who are
psychotic and people who are not. Originating in theory and research about schizotypy (Meehl,
1962), research has increasingly focused on psychotic traits in normal people (Claridge, 1990) in
order to understand the mechanisms of specific psychotic symptoms. This work has focused on
experiences which indicate attenuated versions of more serious symptoms like hallucinations
(defined as the presence of a “perceptual response”, often auditory, in the absence of an
appropriate external stimulus which could have caused it, Launay and Slade, 1981; McCarthy
Jones et al. 2014) and delusions (defined as “false beliefs” which are not concordant with a
person’s culture, and which are held in spite of contradictory beliefs of others and evidence to
the contrary, Coltheart et al., 2011). Scales developed by Launay and Slade (The Launay Slade
Hallucination Scale, LSHS, 1981) and by Peters et al. (The Peters Delusions Inventory, PDI,
1999) assess for the presence (respectively) of “hallucination-like” and “delusion-like”
experiences. Both scales assess for experiences which resemble psychotic symptoms. Thus the
LSHS asks participants about intrusive thoughts and anomalous visual and auditory experiences
across 10 items (i.e. “In the past, I have had the experience of hearing a person’s voice and then
found that no one was there”). The PDI uses 40 items (or 21 in a briefer, recent version)
developed from canonical accounts of delusions (i.e. Schneider’s “first rank symptoms”) and
also assesses for frequency, conviction and degree of distress. The presence of symptoms is
5

taken to indicate a degree of “proneness” in healthy populations, though typically a “prone”
group is defined not in terms of a standard “cut off” number of items, but in relation to the
quantitative characteristics of the sample from which it is drawn (i.e. the upper quartile of scorers
being selected). This assumption has widened the scope of research into mechanisms that
underlie these symptoms by enabling researchers to examine risk factors and mechanisms in
non-clinical samples (e.g. Barkus et al., 2007, Laroi et al., 2005, Gracie et al., 2007). However,
such research rests on the assumption that there is a meaningful relationship between this form of
“proneness” and the symptoms experienced in psychotic illness.
The view that psychotic phenomena lie on a continuum, with clinically diagnosable
illness only representing one extreme of a more widely distributed set of experiences, has gained
moderate support. A meta-analytic review by Van Os et al. (2009) assessed the validity of a
psychosis continuum by aggregating data from an international range of studies of psychotic
experiences in general population samples. The review confirmed a number of predictions made
by the continuum hypothesis, namely that the prevalence and incidence of psychotic experiences
is much higher than that of psychotic illnesses; that such experiences are associated with the
same etiological risk factors (and the same cognitive mechanisms) which have been linked to
psychotic illnesses, and that the presence of such attenuated experiences raises the risk of an
individual developing a full blown psychotic illness. This last finding has been particularly
important in the emergence of a new approach to mental health care, identifying people
manifesting “at risk states” for psychosis, who are regarded as especially vulnerable to
developing schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013a).
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However, the notion of a psychosis continuum has been challenged by David (2010) who
suggests that advocates for the idea have overstated their case. Meanwhile, some have queried
whether the existence of a continuum calls into question any meaningful cut off between ill and
healthy altogether. In practice, a number of diagnostic conventions have arisen to help clinicians
and researchers distinguish those “at risk” from those who have already “transitioned” to illness.
Broadly the central component separating these groups is the presence of reality testing.
Individuals can experience quite elaborate symptoms, but these remain “attenuated” for as long
as they are able to attribute them to plausible causes (i.e. to their “eyes playing tricks” rather than
the presence of someone or something which could not reasonably be there). This places the
capacity for doubt at the center of the distinction between healthy and well, and results in a high
degree of subjective judgment on the part of clinicians.
The concept of “at risk” status for psychosis has emerged over the last 15-20 years,
principally as researchers sought ways to identify populations at greater risk of transition to full
psychotic illness, with the hope of offering preventative clinical intervention pre-emptively
(McGlashan and Johannessen, 1996; Daneault et al. 2013). This effort has been particularly
pronounced in the United States, with the NAPLS study (see, Addington et al. 2012 for an
overview). A wide range of measures and different criteria have been developed to assess
whether individuals can be considered “at risk”, starting with the Perceptual Aberration scale
developed by Chapman and Chapman (1987). Subsequent instruments have been created at
multiple sites internationally, many of them involving the delivery of structured interviews by
trained clinicians or researchers (Daneault et al. 2013). This multiplicity of measures has yielded
different approaches to what constitutes “at risk” status, with some measures focusing on the
presence “attenuated symptoms” (i.e. experiences which are taken to constitute less problematic
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versions of psychotic symptoms, such as “overvalued beliefs” and perceptual anomalies), and
others focusing on “basic symptoms” (i.e. disturbances of drive, affect or attention, Ruhrmann et
al., 2010, which can be considered the first stages of a psychotic illness like schizophrenia).
Proponents of the latter approach have argued that, in addition to “at risk” individuals having an
elevated chance of receiving a diagnosis of a psychotic illness like schizophrenia, they should
also be regarded as ill in their own right, and as eligible for psychiatric diagnosis and treatment
(Ruhrmann et al., 2010). A meta analytic review of social functioning and measures of quality of
life by Fusar Poli et al. (2015) found that “at risk” groups were rated as showing substantially
lower levels of functioning than healthy groups (hedges g=-3.01), with a smaller difference
between them and people with psychotic disorders (hedges g=0.34). This has led some (Tsuang
et al., 2013; Fusar Poli et al., 2014) to advocate that an “attenuated psychosis syndrome” should
be included in the next version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM). This syndrome would consist of symptoms very similar to those seen in psychosis, but in
less severe form, and not accompanied by the same degree of conviction as a full psychotic
illness3.
The notion of an “attenuated psychosis syndrome” raises again the question of where the
cut-off between “ill” and “healthy” should be thought to lie. The idea of a clear distinction has
never been without controversy, and as Fusar-Poli et al.’s (2014, 2015) work, and that of the
suggests, there is good reason for thinking that many of those currently excluded from the DSM
are also experiencing some degree of clinically relevant impairment. However, others (e.g.
3

In fact an “attenuated psychosis syndrome” was included in the last version of the DSM, but only in the appendix
“Conditions for Further Study”. It is defined as follows: “Attenuated psychotic symptoms, as defined in Criterion A,
are psychosis-like but below the threshold for a full psychotic disorder. Compared with psychotic disorders, the
symptoms are less severe and more transient, and insight is relatively maintained. A diagnosis of attenuated
psychosis syndrome requires state psychopathology associated with functional impairment rather than long-standing
trait pathology. The psychopathology has not progressed to full psychotic severity. Attenuated psychosis syndrome
is a disorder based on the manifest pathology and impaired function and distress” (APA, 2013, p.783)
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Bentall, 2004) have argued that some of the individuals currently captured by psychotic
diagnoses in the DSM might be best off not thought of as “ill”, but rather as manifesting a
reasonably “normal” response to their experiences (see also Longden et al. 2012). Until this
question is resolved, there is likely to continue to be debate about where any cut-off should be
drawn. For now, many clinicians presumably follow the suggestion by Wakefield (1992) that
“illness” or “disorder” is present when there is a biological or cognitive dysfunction present
which causes some form of harm (distress or a decline in social functioning) to a person. For the
purposes of the distinction between fully psychotic and just “at risk”, interview measures include
a way of rating subjective degree of certainty with which beliefs are held or hallucinations
accounted for (more on this below). Self-report measures ask participants about attenuated
experiences and rule out individuals who would meet criteria for a psychotic disorder.
The Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ), developed by Loewy et al. (2005) is a self-report
scale for attenuated symptoms which was developed to provide an instrument briefer than
structured clinical interviews, but more comprehensive than symptom-specific measures. It’s 92
item version (a shorter, 16-item version has subsequently been developed, Ising et al., 2012) lists
a range of attenuated symptoms which participants respond “true” or “false” to, depending on
whether they have experienced them within the last month. Constructed by using items from the
Structured Interview for Prodromal Symptoms (SIPS, Miller et al., 2002) and the Schizotypal
Personality Questionnaire (SPQ, Raine, 1991), the PQ assesses prodromal status by providing a
tally of the number of attenuated psychotic symptoms (i.e. “I have heard things other people
couldn't hear like voices of people whispering or talking”; “I have thought that things I saw on
the TV or read in the newspaper had a special meaning for me”) a person has experienced. The
authors of the scale conducted a validity study, establishing a cut score of 8 or more endorsed
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items for reliably diagnosing “at risk” status (Loewy et al., 2005), but the measure also provides
the possibility of a continuous measure as it yields a count of symptoms and an assessment of
whether they are felt to be distressing. The PQ is rooted in an “attenuated symptom” approach
as, although it does assess distress, it does not include clinician-based assessment of functional
impairment.
To a greater extent than research that has focused on the administration of psychometric
measures of symptoms within “normal” populations, the study of high risk states entails the
recruitment of populations of people regarded as meeting criteria for a clinically relevant
syndrome. This gives research into high risk states greater face validity as a source of
information about psychosis. At risk screening measures like the PQ offer the possibility of
assessing the presence “attenuated positive psychotic symptoms” (APPS) and examining the risk
factors and cognitive mechanisms which are associated with being more or less at risk of
psychosis. The fact that around a third of people who meet criteria for high risk states will
transition to full psychosis (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013a) makes this population potentially particularly
informative to study relative to healthy populations in which the risk of developing psychosis is
unknown.
Ideally the criteria for being “at risk” would be narrowed down yet further, and FusarPoli et al. (2013) identify five factors which elevate the risk of transition within “at risk”
samples. These are: genetic risk (psychotic illness among 1st degree relatives) with an attendant
functional decline, high unusual thought content decline, high suspicion/paranoia, low social
functioning and history of substance abuse. More recently, the importance of social functioning
in particular has been highlight by Fusar-Poli et al. 2015, who confirmed that lower functioning
predicts transition to psychosis in a high risk group with a moderate effect size (g=0.43). Work
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on automated speech analysis (Bedi et al. 2015) has also recently pointed to characteristics of
speech as potentially diagnostic. Using a program which parsed the speech individuals at high
risk for semantic coherence and syntactic structure, researchers were able to predict with 100%
accuracy who would develop psychosis in the next two years. This result drew on a relatively
small sample (34, of whom 5 transitioned to full psychosis), but it suggests that verbal behavior
may have a particularly powerful role in distinguishing “at risk” who will become psychotic
from those who won’t. However, while these diagnostic factors can be assessed by clinical and
research protocols, the criteria for specifying “at risk” status have not, at present, been changed
to integrate them.
2.2 Psychological approaches to delusions as a route to understanding psychosis
Delusions are considered a central component of psychosis, having been identified as one
of nine “first rank symptoms” of schizophrenia by the German psychiatrist Kurt Schneider
(Bentall, 2004) and subsequently incorporated into DSM definitions of schizophrenia in every
edition since the introduction of formal criteria in DSM-III. Understanding how delusions arise
can thus provide an important route to understanding psychosis more generally. The latest
version of the DSM (APA, 2013) defines delusions relatively briefly as “fixed beliefs that are not
amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence”. The manual then goes on to distinguish
“Persecutory delusions” (the belief “that one is going to be harmed, harassed, and so forth by an
individual, organization, or other group”); “Referential delusions” (the belief “that certain
gestures, comments, environmental cues, and so forth are directed at oneself”); “Grandiose
delusions” (an individual’s belief that “he or she has exceptional abilities, wealth, or fame”);
“Erotomanic delusions” (an individual’s false belief “that another person is in love with him or
her); Nihilistic delusions (“the conviction that a major catastrophe will occur”), and somatic
delusions (“preoccupations regarding health and organ function”).
11

However, there is considerable controversy about when a belief can be considered
“delusional” as opposed to merely mistaken or unusual (David, 1999), and even whether the
phenomena commonly labelled “delusions” ought to be considered as beliefs at all (e.g.
Hamilton, 2007; Radden, 2010). DSM-5 explicitly acknowledges the first of these difficulties,
saying that “the distinction between a delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to
make and depends in part on the degree of conviction with which the belief is held despite clear
or reasonable contradictory evidence regarding its veracity” (APA, 2013, p.87). In practice,
certain belief-like states of mind are taken by clinicians to be sufficiently distressing and
ungrounded in evidence that they warrant clinical attention. Where an individual lacks insight or
the capacity to entertain doubt about such a belief (i.e. a loss of “reality testing”) it is considered
delusional (Arango and Carpenter, 2011). Some authors (e.g. Cermolacce et al., 2010) have
suggested assessing delusions not only in terms of their verbal content, but also in terms of the
“conditions of intersubjective encounter” between the clinician and the patient. Whether or not
delusions can be said to be beliefs (as opposed to attitudes, as suggested by Radden, 2010), they
nonetheless have a distinctive cognitive structure (Gerrans, 2013), which it behooves clinical
psychological researchers to understand.
Just as there is no entirely uncontroversial distinction between delusional and nondelusional beliefs/attitudes, so there is no widely accepted distinction between fully psychotic
delusions and attenuated/prodromal delusion-like states. Measures of attenuated symptoms like
the PQ or the SIPS include items that resemble delusions, but which are more closely akin to
“normal” experiences than the strong conviction entailed by the DSM criteria for a delusion (e.g.
items 38 is “I have felt that other people were watching me or talking about me;” these
experiences are taken to be prima facie less unusual than delusions, but similar in character). The
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section of the SIPS which deals with positive symptoms (and thus includes experiences similar to
delusions) refers to “overvalued ideas” rather than delusions, and one way in which the
distinction between an attenuated symptom and a psychotic symptom is made is by reference to
whether the individual is able to entertain doubt regarding the veracity of their belief
(McGlashan et al., 2010).
Much recent psychological research on delusions has built on the conclusion that the
cognitive psychological aspects of this manifestation of psychosis may be substantially shared
between people who manifest “full and frank” delusional symptomatology and people who
display “at risk states” or “proneness” (Garety and Freeman, 2013). One theme that emerges
from this research is that delusions are not merely epiphenomenal manifestations of an
underlying brain disorder, but also have psychological characteristics, which may play a
significant role in their etiology. One of these, the “jumping to conclusions bias”, has been
widely investigated in clinical and non-clinical samples, and will be discussed below. No single
overarching factor has been identified as the cause of delusions, rather multi-factorial models are
proposed (Garety and Freeman, 2013).
2.3 Multi-factor models
In one early theoretical cognitive account of delusions, Maher (1974) suggested that
unusual reasoning processes were less important to the formation of delusions than some form of
“unusual and intense phenomenological experience”. Maher was responding to the suggestion
that a delusional belief could only result from an “underlying disorder of thinking” such as
“faulty syllogistic reasoning”, leading to the drawing of a false conclusion (a delusion).
However, according to Maher, this sort of disorder of inferential process might not be necessary;
an anomalous experience would be sufficient, on its own, to result in a delusion. Theorists have
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subsequently argued that this sort of anomalous experience is necessary but not sufficient for the
formation of delusional beliefs (McKay, 2012). Why this is the case will be explained in greater
detail below.
Contemporary cognitive theorists (e.g. Bell et al., 2006; Freeman, 2007) propose that a
theory of the formation of delusions must contain multiple factors, to account for the various
aspects that go together to make up the complex presentation of a clinical delusion. Each
component of a delusion begs explanation; the nature of its content, the degree of conviction
with which it is held and its immunity to being refuted. As Coltheart et al. (2011) point out, this
multiplicity of components makes the explanatory task formidable. However, most models
include at least two principal factors, and a subset of theorists have suggested that these may be
sufficient to explain the core experience of delusions: how it comes to be that some people
develop and hold highly unusual beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. Here I focus on
the two factor model proposed by Coltheart et al. (2011), who propose that in order to develop a
delusional belief, two components may be sufficient; an “unusual perceptual phenomenon”
(p.285), and “defective belief evaluation” (p.285).
Coltheart et al.’s model is intended to explain what they term “monothematic” delusions,
such as the Capgras delusion, where a person comes to believe that their family members have
been replaced by identical imposters. A two factor account of Capgras delusion was outlined by
Ellis and colleagues (Ellis et al., 1990) who posited that this experience could arise from a deficit
in the cognitive-affective processes involved in face recognition. Ellis et al. (1997) demonstrated
that patients with Capgras delusion demonstrated an attenuated autonomic response to familiar
faces, suggesting that they did not emotionally distinguish between relatives and strangers, even
though they could visually recognize them. Here the relevant “first factor” is moderately clearly
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delineated (an absence of the autonomic arousal normally associated with recognizing a family
member). However, as Coltheart et al. (2011) point out, it is insufficient on its own, as not all
individuals who experience this emotional-recognition deficit will develop the delusion. A
second factor is required, namely a faulty inductive reasoning process whereby the individual
starts with an anomalous subjective experience and derives an unwarranted inference to account
for it. In the Capgras delusion, the unwarranted inference is the contention that a relative is in
fact an imposter. This two-factor model is supposed to be able to account for all monothematic
delusions, and Coltheart et al. (2007) have suggested it is also relevant in the context of
schizophrenia.
In comprehensive review of the psychological mechanisms associated specifically with
paranoia, Freeman (2007) suggests that anomalous experiences (of the sort which could play a
role as a first factor) had been under-researched in this area. One reason for this may be that,
while the Capgras delusion has been frequently associated with specific neurological damage
(such as lesions to the right lateral prefrontal cortex, Coltheart, 2007), many delusional
syndromes, such as schizophrenia and other related psychotic illnesses have been less
consistently associated with a specific neurological abnormality, making it harder to identify a
consistent cause of a relevant “first factor” across all cases. (Radden, 2010, draws out this
difference further, making a distinction between monothematic “deficit delusions” such as those
seen after strokes or traumatic brain injury, and “complex paranoid systems”, such as those seen
in disorders like schizophrenia, Radden, 2010, p.27).
Nonetheless, Coltheart et al. (2011) propose that their model may have relevance for
psychotic illnesses like schizophrenia, and suggest two potential candidates for a first and a
second factor in delusions, the first of which has started to gain attention from psychosis
15

researchers, and the second of which has been widely researched since the late 1980s. They
suggest that one relevant candidate for a relevant “first factor” could be aberrant salience (Kapur,
2003), a feeling of strange, undue significance, bestowed upon environmental phenomena which
is posited to yield “unusual and intense” sensory experiences of the sort which demand some
explanation. Meanwhile, a specific disorder of hasty inferential reasoning, a “Jumping-toconclusions bias (JTC) or “epistemological impulsiveness” (Bentall, 2004) may be a viable
“second factor”, which leads people to draw a delusional inference to explain their anomalous
experience. In the next sections I will review the existing evidence on these two posited “factors”
and their prevalence in samples of people who exhibit them.
A difficulty with this two factor account of delusional ideation is that while it would be
consistent with liberal acceptance of a belief most people would reject (i.e. the “taking hold” of
an implausible belief), it is also consistent with subsequent acceptance of a new belief with
minimal new evidence (i.e. the rapid rejection of a delusion in favor of an alternative candidate
belief). Clinical delusions are described as beliefs held with an incorrigible degree of conviction,
so how could a two factor theory explain this? One possibility is that the two factors are not the
whole picture. Thus it may be that they are necessary but not sufficient factors (in which case an
extra factor is required to account for the incorrigibility). Alternatively, it might be that a
reasoning bias toward “jumping to conclusions” does not entail a willingness to relinquish
conclusions which have already been reached. Fine et al. (2007) present some evidence which is
consistent with this latter possibility, concluding that, although a tendency to “jump to
conclusions” is reliably associated with delusional belief, a tendency to update beliefs in the face
of contradictory evidence is not. Thus the presence of a jumping to conclusions bias does not
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appear to entail a tendency to jump to new conclusions once an initial conclusion has been
drawn. I will now discuss the two candidate factors in greater detail.
2.3.1. Factor One: Aberrant Salience
The aberrant salience framework was initially proposed by Kapur (2003), who suggested
that the role of dopamine as a regulator of motivational salience (Berridge and Robinson, 1998,
Berridge, 2007) could help to explain how a postulated dopamine dysregulation in psychosis
could lead to the positive symptoms of this disorder. Salience refers to the way that an
environmental stimulus is rendered appetitive or aversive rather than just a “cold bit of
information” (Kapur, 2003, p.14). This process bestows a sense of significance on things we
wish to acquire or avoid, allowing them to stand out for us against a background. However in
psychosis the production of both stimulated and unstimulated phasic striatal dopamine is
elevated (Abi-Dargham and Grace, 2011), and this may result in the attribution of “aberrant
salience” (Kapur, 2003). By Kapur’s account, the extra sense of significance also entails a
demand for a subjective explanation, and it is this element which can contribute to the formation
of a delusion.
Kapur suggests that this theoretical framework fits particularly well with the early stages
of psychosis, as it is commensurate with phenomenological accounts given by people in the early
stages of delusion formation, who describe a feeling of “heightened awareness” and a drive to
“make sense” of the situation. Kapur’s account of aberrant salience in these terms is thus
commensurate with the description of an “intense and unusual phenomenological experience”
described by Coltheart et al. (2011). Investigators have deployed experimental (Roiser et al.
2009) and self-report measures (Cicero et al.2010) in an attempt to assess aberrant salience in the
context of psychosis.
2.3.2 Experimental Measure: The Salience Attribution Test:
17

Kapur’s theory predicts that the way salience is assigned to objects will be different in
individuals who demonstrated aberrant salience. This is described in terms of subjective changes
in the experience of “significance” (Kapur, 2003), but given the putative centrality of “salience”
to reward learning, it has also been possible to derive behavioral predictions about people’s
responses to learning tasks. Roiser et al. (2009) developed an experimental measure to assess
salience attribution behaviorally; The Salience Attribution Test (SAT: see detailed description
below). The SAT is based on an implicit-learning procedure and requires participants to learn the
financial contingencies associated with different visual stimuli. Reaction times provide
behavioral measures of implicit aberrant and adaptive salience, and ratings on a Visual Analogue
Scale provide explicit aberrant and adaptive salience.
In this paradigm, the variables of greatest interest are implicit and explicit aberrant
salience, both of which represent an effort to derive an index of the tendency to irrelevantly "tag"
stimuli with salience, even when they are not rewarded (Kapur, 2003). Implicit aberrant salience
is the tendency to show increased speeding to irrelevant trials, and explicit aberrant salience is
the tendency to show evidence of a false-belief that they were more likely to be rewarded on
these trials (see method section, below, for further details). The concept of adaptive salience
arises from evidence suggesting that, under normal conditions, animals and humans will show a
tendency to react more quickly (a “speeding” response) to stimuli that have come to be
associated with a reward, and that this response is mediated by the mesolimbic dopamine system
(Wyvell and Berridge, 2000; Roiser et al., 2009). This reasoning is rooted on the theory that
dopamine's role in processing reward is grounded in regulating salience rather than the hedonic,
pleasurable aspects of reward (Berridge, 2007).
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Roiser et al. (2009) found that when they administered this task to people with and
without a diagnosis of schizophrenia, there was evidence of differential salience attribution
between groups. Individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia showed lower levels of adaptive
salience than controls, and when they conducted an analysis directly comparing those patients
with delusional symptoms to patients without, delusions specifically were associated with
aberrant salience. Roiser et al. (2013) administered the SAT to a group of 18 individuals who
met the criteria for an “at risk mental state” as measured by the Comprehensive Assessment of
At Risk Mental State (CAARMS) and to 18 healthy controls. They also undertook fMRI scans of
the participants during the procedure. At risk individuals were more likely to attribute salience to
task-irrelevant features (showing significantly greater explicit aberrant salience), and this
tendency was associated with a greater intensity of delusional ideation as measured by the
“thought content” subscale of the CAARMS.
The SAT has subsequently been linked directly to the functioning of the human striatal
dopamine system. Nagy et al. (2012) administered the task to individuals newly diagnosed with
Parkinson’s Disease (PD) and matched controls. Twelve weeks later the PD patient group had
received a dopamine agonist (pramipexole or ropinirole) as part of treatment, and were
administered the SAT a second time. Nagy et al. found that participants who had taken the
dopaminergic drug showed an increase in aberrant and adaptive salience relative to the baseline
measurement. Furthermore, the increase in aberrant salience (but not the increase in adaptive
salience) was associated with self-reported anomalous subjective “psychotic-like” experiences as
measured by the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al,
1995). Nagy et al. took this to suggest that while dopaminergic medications may enhance
adaptive salience (a stand in for “acuity and motivation, which are degraded by Parkinson’s
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disease), they may also increase a tendency toward aberrant salience, and thereby elevate the risk
of the psychotic symptoms, which are sometimes a side effect of these medications.
However, the behavioral results of Roiser et al. (2009) and (2013) were not replicated in
a recent study (Smielskova et al. 2015), that used the SAT in an fMRI procedure. Smielskova
and colleagues compared adaptive and aberrant salience across four groups: 34 individuals with
a CAARMS defined “At Risk Mental State”, 29 individuals with a first episode psychosis
(divided into 17 who were taking antipsychotic medication and 12 who were not), and 19 healthy
controls. A multiple group comparison revealed no group differences on any of the SAT
behavioral outcomes. The authors suggest this may result from high within-group variability
seem in their sample, and point out that their control group showed higher levels of explicit
aberrant salience than Roiser et al.’s (2009). They also raise the possibility of differences
between their first episode sample and Roiser et al.’s schizophrenic sample, who had been on
potentially salience-disrupting medication for longer. Another possibility is that these relatively
small samples produce under-powered statistical results and are prone to producing idiosyncratic,
non-replicable results. Smielskova et al. did find group differences in the fMRI component of
their study, consistent with activation of specific regions of the “salience network”
(Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2013). However, without corresponding behavioral findings, this
result lacks clear explanatory power.
Studies which employ the Salience Attribution Test have included measures of
potentially confounding neuropsychological factors, including measures of IQ, and processing
speed (Roiser et al., 2009; 2013). One potentially confounding factor that has not been examined
is the capacity to switch from one set of task demands to an alternative. The SAT demands that a
person be able to respond more quickly in to one set of stimuli than to others. It purports to be
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measuring the presence of disrupted salience processing (i.e. a tendency to attribute less visual
significance to stimuli). However, an important alternative and as yet untested possibility is that
a failure of speeding to “task-relevant” stimuli over task irrelevant stimuli represents a general
deficit in the speed with which an individual is able to undertake task switching. In the present
study this possibility was controlled for by the inclusion of the trail making task from the DelisKaplan Executive Frontal System (Delis et al., 2001). It has been suggested that the trail making
task measures speed and cognitive fluidity (Salthouse, 2011). If these motor factors are
impacting performance on the SAT, a correlation would be expected between adaptive salience
and TMT performance.
2.3.3. Self Report Measure: The Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI):
Aberrant Salience has also been operationalized using self-report. The Aberrant Salience
Inventory (ASI) is a pen and paper measure of Aberrant Salience (Cicero et al. 2010), which
aims to assess for the presence of a heightening of various subjective phenomenological features
associated with Kapur’s theory of aberrant salience.
In the first study using the ASI, Cicero et al. (2010) conducted an exploratory factor
analysis which suggested a five factor structure to aberrant salience, and confirmed the presence
of a single higher order factor to which these were all related. The authors also assessed the
convergence of their aberrant salience measure with other constructs considered to be related to
psychosis (Eckbald & Chapman’s 1983, Magical Ideation Scale; Chapman et al’s 1978
Perceptual Aberration Scale, and Lenzenweger et al.’s 1997 Referential Thinking Scale)
confirming that while the ASI correlated with these and not with measures of social anhedonia.
When a “psychosis proneness” group was defined using the same measures, this group scored
more highly on the ASI than controls. Finally, when the measure was administered to a clinical
sample (36 of whom had a history of psychotic disorders and 28 of whom did not), the patients
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with psychotic disorders had a significantly higher mean score on the ASI (Cohen’s d= 0.57)
than the non-psychotic psychiatric patients. A logistic regression analysis also suggested that the
ASI successfully predicted to which group participants belonged.
Cicero et al. (2013) administered the ASI, alongside a measure of “Self-Concept
Clarity” (SCC) (“the extent to which one’s beliefs about one’s attributes are clear, confidently
held, internally consistent, stable, and cognitively accessible”, Stinson, Wood, & Doxey, 2008, p.
1541, quoted by Cicero et al. 2013, p.34) to three larger samples of people with high levels of
“psychotic like experiences” (PLEs). They hypothesized that low SCC and high ASI should
interact to predict elevated rates of PLEs (measured by adding together results on the Perceptual
Aberration scale, Chapman et al. 1978 and the Magical Ideation Scale, Eckblad & Chapman,
1983). They found that the relationship between ASI and PLEs was moderated by SCC, such that
high ASI was only associated with PLEs under conditions of low SCC. A second study
replicated this finding, and extended it by including a specific measure of delusional ideation and
distress (The Peters’ Delusions Inventory, Peters et al. 2004). A third study incorporated a
measure of neuroticism to rule out the possibility that the ASI/SCC interaction could be
accounted for this variable. No three-way interaction was revealed by this analysis, and there was
no two-way interaction between either ASI and neuroticism, or SCC and neuroticism in
predicting PLEs. The results of Cicero et al.’s large sample studies suggest that aberrant salience
may not be sufficient to produce PLEs, but could work in concert with other psychological
characteristics. They do not link this explicitly to the two factor framework, but do suggest that
the nature of the interaction between ASI and SCC may result from the way that low SelfConcept Clarity impacts on the willingness an individual has to construct a psychotic explanation
for an experience.
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Cicero et al. (2015) extended this finding to 162 individuals screened using the Structured
Interview for Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS), a more detailed interview measure of psychosis “at
risk” state. In this study 162 undergraduate participants were divided into a “positive schizotypy”
group (i.e., scoring high on measure of positive psychotic symptoms: n=53), a negative
schizotypy group (i.e. scoring high on a measure of social anhedonia, a distinct component of
schizotypy more akin to negative psychotic symptoms: n=64), and a comparison group of 45
individuals who did not meet criteria for these groups. The authors replicated the pattern of their
(2013), finding that SCC was negatively correlated with interview rated psychotic like
experiences at high levels of ASI, and confirmed that this interaction was only true in the case of
positive schizotypy, and not in relation to negative schizotypy. This is what would be predicted
by aberrant salience theory, which gives salience dysregulation a role in positive symptoms, but
not in negative symptoms (Cicero et al., 2015).
2.3.4 Factor Two: The Jumping to Conclusions Bias

Recent psychological models of psychosis have suggested that anomalous experiences
alone are insufficient to account for psychosis (Bell et al., 2007; Coltheart et al., 2011), and that a
second factor is required. This second factor is posited to be some deficit in reasoning ability (as
opposed to the single factor model of Maher, 1974, who specifically argued that normal
reasoning processes could lead to delusional beliefs), which differs systematically from normal
reasoning. Human reasoning under conditions of uncertainty is known to be suboptimal across
multiple domains among normal individuals and even “experts” (see Kahneman, 2011 for a
review). This makes it complicated to define “healthy” and “pathological” reasoning, and Huq et
al. (1988) even suggest that the reasoning process manifested by people with delusions could
even be closer to being “optimal” (as defined by Bayesian estimates of probability) than people
without. Nonetheless, a tendency to draw inferences in a way that systematically differs from
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normal, and which gave rise to delusions, could be considered pathological in virtue of its role in
causing psychotic symptomatology. One candidate which has been proposed is a systematic
disposition to draw conclusions more quickly than non-delusional individuals, a tendency which
Bentall (2004) describes as “epistemological impulsiveness” and which has come to be called the
“jumping to conclusions bias” (Garety et al. 1991; Freeman and Garety, 2014).
The use of a reasoning task to investigate a “jumping to conclusions bias” was introduced
into the literature on psychosis by Huq et al. (1988) who compared the performance of 15
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and experiencing delusions, with 10 non-deluded
patient controls, and 15 individuals with no psychiatric diagnosis on the “beads task”. In this
version of the task, participants were presented with two jars. One jar contained 85 green beads
and 15 pink beads; the other had the same proportions but the colors inverted (85 pink, 15
green). Beads were then “drawn” from the jars as though at random and shown to participants in
a sequence, which the researchers had actually predetermined. In the simplest condition of the
task, participants were required to decide which jar they thought the beads were coming from,
but could “draw” as many beads as they wished before they decided. Three other conditions were
also included; requiring participants to rate the probability of a particular color being next
(condition 2), rate the probability that a given bead came from a particular jar (condition 3), and
a combination of both of these latter (condition 4). The dependent variable was the number of
beads drawn before the jar was decided upon (“draws to decision”). The “deluded” group in this
study showed an average of 1.22 “draws to decision”, while controls had an average of 2.60.
This group difference was significant.
This study introduced the notion of a specific deficit in the evaluation of evidence to form
beliefs. Huq et al. (1988) concluded that delusions could be formulated as a failure of Bayesian
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belief updating, with participants demonstrating insufficient caution before drawing a
conclusion. The precise nature of the JTC bias remains somewhat controversial, with various
accounts of whether the demonstrable difference between delusional and non-delusional
individuals on the “beads task” is best considered to arise from a deficit in memory (i.e. a
difficulty holding information about multiple beads in mind and so “giving up” more quickly), a
greater “need for closure”, or even from a tendency to imbue each piece of information (i.e. each
bead) with a greater sense of significance, and thereby reach a conclusion more quickly (Fine et
al. 2007). Another important issue is whether performance on the beads task is indicative of an
underlying bias in evidential reasoning (as proponents have claimed), or a result of the diverse
range of cognitive deficits present in schizophrenia.
Huq et al. (1988) did not check for the potential confound of behavioral impulsivity,
though they did compare delusional subjects to psychiatric controls, to control for non-delusion
specific cognitive deficits that may be associated with mental illness. Subsequent examinations
of JTC and impulsivity have tended to suggest it does not account for performance on the beads
task.
Dudley et al. (1997) administered two versions of the beads task (the original 85:15
version and a harder 60:40 version) to three groups: patients with delusions, patients with
depression and healthy controls. They found that, although the delusions group still drew fewer
beads than the other groups across conditions (replicating previous work), they also drew
significantly more beads on the harder version (finding later replicated by Garety et al. 2013).
Dudley et al. took this to suggest that the delusion group was demonstrating a data gathering bias
rather than simply acting impulsively by responding after a set number of beads. This result
speaks against the suggestion that impulsivity drives the JTC effect, but it does not rule out the
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possibility; it may be that the extra difficulty of the 60:40 version counteracts some degree of
impulsivity in individuals with delusions, but that this is still what drives the effect. More
compellingly, Lunt et al. (2012) administered the beads task to a group of individuals with
frontal lobe damage, a group with ADHD and a group of healthy controls. Although the frontal
lobe damage group demonstrated a data gathering bias relative to the other two groups, the
ADHD group did not differ from the healthy controls, a finding which Lunt et al. took to suggest
that impulsivity is unrelated to the data gathering bias. Furthermore in a factor analysis which
examined various social and neurocognitive tasks in psychosis, van Hooren et al. (2008) found
performance on the beads task to be correlated only weakly with performance on the Trail
Making Task (r=0.19), but not correlated with the Stroop test or semantic fluency.
2.3.5. JTC in People with delusions
Since Huq et al.’s initial study, the presence of a JTC bias in samples of people with
delusions has been replicated multiple times and been subject to a number of reviews (e.g.
Garety and Freeman, 1999; Freeman and Garety, 2014). The dependent variable in the task has
increasingly been dichotomously defined in the terms of the presence or absence of a JTC-bias,
defined by the selection of two beads or fewer before making a decision. In a systematic review
of the literature on persecutory delusions Freeman (2007) suggested that the unusual robustness
of the effect across 10 reviewed studies made the JTC bias a rare phenomenon in the context of
psychosis research.
Fine et al. (2007) conducted several meta-analyses to test competing explanations of the
JTC bias, and determined that comparisons between schizophrenic groups with and without
delusions suggest a reliable association with this positive symptom. This suggests that the bias
cannot be accounted for simply in terms of being an “epiphenomenon” of the neurocognitive
deficits (i.e. vigilance, sustained attention, Green, 2001) which are associated with
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schizophrenia. Specifically, Fine et al. concluded that the 12 studies they analyzed supported the
theory that a JTC bias is driven by a tendency to make a decision on the basis of less evidence,
rather than a tendency to ignore disconfirmatory evidence. Studies which specifically examined
the use of disconfirmatory evidence (i.e. sequencing beads so that they suggested one jar initially
and then a different jar, making it rational to change one’s mind) found that delusional
individuals expressed significantly greater uncertainty than non-delusional individuals under
such circumstances. Thus, it is not that delusional individuals are more stubborn about their
conclusions, but rather they are quicker to draw them. Fine and colleagues also tested the
suggestion that, rather than being a causal factor in the generation of delusional beliefs, the JTC
bias might be a result of general cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia. They
aggregated the results of studies which compared schizophrenia patients with and without
delusions, and which examined the bias in a group with delusional disorder vs. psychiatric
controls. These approaches control for the possibility that the bias might be an epiphenomenon
of schizophrenia per se by ensuring that the difference between control and experimental groups
is limited to the presence of delusions and does not also include broad cognitive deficits. If a JTC
bias were an epiphenomenon of psychosis per se, this specific association with delusions would
not be expected, hence Fine et al. rule out what they call the “strong epiphenomenon hypothesis”
(“that the JTC effect is purely a consequence of schizophrenic symptomatology unrelated to the
presence of delusions per se”). However, they were not able to rule out what they call the “weak
epiphenomenon hypothesis”, that schizophrenic symptomatology makes a contribution to the
presence of the JTC bias, because they found the effect to be stronger in deluded participants
diagnosed with schizophrenia than in non-deluded, schizophrenia-diagnosed controls.
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A recent meta-analysis (Malcolm-Ross et al. 2015) found slightly less encouraging
results in terms of strength of the JTC bias in people with clinically significant delusions
compared to healthy controls. These authors examined all studies in which the Jumping to
conclusions bias had been used in samples which were also assessed with the Peters Delusions
Inventory PDI; Peters et al., 1999). The authors found that the association between the bias
(operationalized by a smaller number of “draws to decision”) and a high score on the PDI is
robust but small (Cohen’s d = 0.03). The effect was most stable among the subgroup of studies
that had examined it in non-clinical samples. When they took the subgroup of studies which had
examined the bias in people with current delusions, the aggregated effect was not significant.
This study has been the first to suggest that the association between the JTC bias and delusions is
not as strong as has been thought. However, two important caveats should be noted about this
result. First, Malcolm-Ross and colleagues suggest that their result could be due to the low
statistical power of subgroup analysis. Second, by only examining studies which have deployed
the PDI, Malcolm-Ross and colleagues exclude a number of studies such as Huq et al. (1988)
and Garety et al. (1991) which first established the presence of the effect among delusion
positive samples. A planned systematic review and meta-analysis of all JTC like tasks (Taylor et
al. 2014) will better reveal the extent of any effect.
2.3.6. JTC in at Risk States
To date only one study has examined the jumping to conclusions bias in a sample of
people clinically assessed as being “at risk” for psychosis, a group which may be critical for
understanding how psychotic symptoms first emerge. Broome et al. (2007) administered three
versions of the task (an “easy” one with an 85:15 ratio of beads; a harder version, with a 60:40
ratio and a hardest version with three jars, with ratios of 44:28:28) to 35 individuals with an “at
risk mental state” (ARMS) and 23 healthy controls. They found that draws to decision among the
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ARMS averaged 8.5, compared to 13.4 in the controls on the 60:40 version of the task and 12.5
compared to 17.5 on the 44:28:28 version. These differences were significant. However, unlike
the majority of studies which have examined the phenomenon in people with full blown
delusional states, they did not find a significant effect for the 85:15 version4. The authors suggest
this may be due to the 60:40 version being harder, and therefore more sensitive to the presence of
an attenuated version of the JTC bias in groups of people who have not developed full-blown
symptoms. It may also be a result of the fact that Broome et al.’s experimental group was defined
in terms of individuals meeting criteria for an “at risk mental state” and not in terms of the
presence of delusion-like experiences per se (thus diluting the effect in an essentially
heterogeneous group). Nonetheless this result points to the presence of a JTC bias in people who
are at risk of developing psychosis, a finding which ought to be replicated in a larger sample.
Furthermore, while Broome et al.’s study can be taken as tentative evidence for the presence of a
reasoning deficit in people at risk of developing psychosis, it does not examine how this putative
factor might interact with other factors to produce full-blown psychotic symptoms. Thus further
research is required to confirm the presence of a JTC bias alongside attenuated psychotic
symptoms, and to clarify what the role of this bias might be in concert with other factors that are
postulated to contribute to psychosis.
2.3.7. Sensitivity and the “beads task”
Multiple versions of the beads task appear in the literature, with the most frequently
varying element being the ratio of the differently colored beads. The original task used a ratio of
85:15, though this is now commonly referred to as the “easy” version of the task, with a 60:40
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The authors do not state whether the order of these tasks was counterbalanced. This raises the possibility of tasksequencing effects such that performance on one of the “versions” of the task is systematically altered in virtue of
having been preceded by practice on the other.
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ratio regarded as a more difficult task. The results of Broome et al. (2007), who found a group
difference between “at risk” individuals and controls on the hard version but not the easy,
suggest that the “easy” 85:15 version of the Jumping to Conclusions task may be insufficiently
sensitive to differences between two groups not actively experiencing delusions. This makes it
important to include an easy version in the proposed study, which focuses on a sample that
closely resembles Broome et al.’s.
2.4. Aberrant Salience and Jumping to Conclusions as distinct “factors”:
Cognition is known to be altered in psychosis, with numerous studies and multiple
reviews confirming the presence of a range of deficits in populations with schizophrenia
(Fioravanti et al., 2005; Fatouros-Bergman et al., 2014), and in individuals at clinical “high risk”
(Bora et al., 2014). These deficits range across the domains of perception (Green et al., 2011);
working memory (Lee & Park, 2005); attention and vigilance (Elvevåg et al., 2000) and
executive function (Fioravanti et al., 2005).
Whether aberrant salience and the JTC bias can be viewed as distinct constructs, and thus
as good candidates for the “first” and “second” factors of Coltheart et al.’s (2011) model,
depends on whether performance on tasks which set out to measure them can be shown not to
result from such cognitive deficits. Furthermore, it is theoretically important to show that
aberrant salience and the JTC bias themselves are distinct cognitive processes rather than merely
epiphenomena of the same underlying process.
In terms of the first question, the JTC bias has been examined in the context of several
neurocognitive processes, with a strong suggestion that memory deficits play a role in the bias.
Garety et al. (2013) performed the largest study of this nature, and found that the JTC bias is
associated with poorer working memory, a finding which was also present in Broome et al.
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(2007). Additionally, when Menon et al. (2006) performed a version of the beads task in which
each drawn bead remained visible as a memory aid to the participant, no difference was found
between deluded and non-deluded patients with schizophrenia. No other cognitive deficit has
been reliably associated with the beads task, though the role of impulsivity has been examined
(see above) and executive functioning (as measured by rule-extraction tasks) has been shown in
one study to be associated with beads task performance (Garety et al., 2013).
Aberrant Salience has been less widely assessed than the JTC bias. In theory this
experience ought to be expected to arise not from a disrupted neurocognitive impairment, but
from a disorder of neuromodulation (i.e. the “mood” which is bestowed on subjective
experience, Kapur, 2003). However, the experimental assessment of aberrant salience (the SAT)
draws on processes of memory, attention and inhibitory control, and so differences in
performance between psychosis and non-psychosis groups are vulnerable to confounding by
these cognitive factors. Schmidt and Roiser (2009) assessed the divergent validity of the SAT by
administering it concurrently with measures of working memory, IQ, probabilistic reward
learning, learned irrelevance and sensitivity to probability. They performed a factor analysis with
variables from all these measures and discerned five distinct factors; “operant/explicit learning”,
“general cognitive ability”, “cognitive speeding”, “implicit aberrant salience” and “attentional
vigilance”. Schmidt and Roiser took the emergence of a distinct “implicit aberrant salience”
factor to be particularly strong evidence of good construct validity, and also found that measures
of working memory and IQ loaded onto separate factors from their outcome variables of interest
from the SAT. In subsequent studies, Roiser and colleagues have administered the SAT and in
one study found only explicit adaptive salience to be positively correlated with a proxy measure
of IQ (the Weschler Adult Reading Test) and the forwards and backwards versions of the digit
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span task (Roiser et al, 2009). In a second study, no such correlations were found, leading Roiser
at al. (2013) to conclude, “elevated aberrant salience scores in UHR individuals were unlikely to
be secondary to some general cognitive deficit” (p.1331).
In terms of the second question, several lines of evidence tentatively suggest that the
aberrant salience and the JTC bias can be viewed as distinct constructs: a. It has been shown that
pharmacological treatments which impact on dopamine functioning (and thus should also impact
on salience regulation) do not impact on the JTC bias. b. Studies which have examined the JTC
bias in detail have not found evidence to suggest that the JTC bias is driven by dysregulated
salience and c. Studies which have compared the JTC bias across multiple “levels” of delusional
ideation.
2.4.1. Pharmacological Studies
The two components of psychosis described above have started to be examined together.
Andreou et al. (2013) performed a randomized double blind trial in which 36 healthy participants
(age 18-40) with no history of mental illness or treatment with psychotropic drugs were divided
into three groups and administered L-DOPA (a promoter of dopamine synthesis), Haloperidol (a
drug which blocks the impact of dopamine by occupying receptors) or a Placebo. Using a double
dummy experimental design to ensure testing began at the maximum serum concentration for
each drug, experimenters gave participants a version of the beads task (the fish in lakes version)
and a procedure that tested their confidence for memories. There was no impact of dopamine
related substance on draws to decision. However, participants administered Haloperidol showed
significantly less overconfidence than either the L-DOPA or placebo groups on incorrect
responses to the false memory task. The authors suggest that this could be due to the separation
of two factors, aberrant salience and JTC-bias, and that it is plausible that these would interact to
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give rise to delusional beliefs. Like Broome et al. (2007), the authors suggest that the 60: 40
beads task is better than the 85:15 version for discriminating among healthy subjects.
There is evidence that antipsychotic treatment (which has been theoretically and
experimentally linked to aberrant salience) does not reduce the JTC bias, suggesting that this
component of delusional belief can be considered distinct, and potentially trait-like. Peters and
Garety (2006), and So et al. (2012) conducted longitudinal studies in which the beads task was
administered over multiple time points during a study of treatments. In these studies a JTC bias
was found to be consistent, even while other measures of delusional intensity, and delusion
related distress declined. This raises the possibility that antipsychotic medications act on a
distinct “factor” in terms of their action on delusions Additionally, Menon et al. (2008) found
that the presence of a JTC bias on an emotionally salient version of the task (in which individuals
“draw” adjectives to form a conclusion about whether they describe the self or another person)
moderates the effectiveness of antipsychotic treatment. Individuals who demonstrated the bias
showed less improvement in positive symptoms over time. Menon et al. suggest that this result is
consistent with the hypothesis that the JTC bias represents a distinct risk factor for delusions.
However, this result was not found in a neutral (beads) version of the task. Their use of an
emotionally salient version of the task potentially blurs the boundary between a cognitive
“reasoning” factor and an emotionally-salient factor. Menon et al. may be measuring something
other than “jumping to conclusions” reasoning per se. That they did not break down their results
into different types of positive symptom and still found a moderating relationship provides
tentative support for the role of some form of “jumping to conclusions” bias in all positive
psychotic symptoms.
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2.4.2. Detailed studies
In their meta-analysis examining the details of the JTC bias in psychosis, Fine et al.
(2007) considered the hypothesis that the JTC bias could be driven by emotional salience, i.e.
that the tendency to make fewer “draws to decision” could result from each draw being imbued
with heightened salience, and therefore feeling subjectively more important in determining
which jar it came from. They found that studies which had made beads (or, more frequently the
bead-equivalents in tasks which were superficially different, but structurally analogous to the
beads task) more emotionally salient did not exacerbate the strength of the difference in JTC bias
between delusional and non-delusional groups. They concluded that Kapur’s aberrant salience
hypothesis could not explain the JTC bias, which presumably results from another psychological
mechanism unrelated to salience regulation. This finding supports the view that aberrant salience
and a JTC bias can be regarded as distinct factors.
2.4.3. Testing JTC across different “levels” of delusions
To date five studies have taken the approach of comparing the bias across more than two
levels of delusion (typically two “healthy” groups scoring “high” and “low” on a measure of
delusion proneness, and a clinical group with a diagnosis of a delusional disorder. Results have
been mixed. Van Dael et al. (2006) compared four groups of increasing risk; 40 patients with
schizophrenia diagnoses and delusions, 40 first-degree relatives, 41 “psychosis prone”
individuals and 53 healthy controls. The researchers defined the JTC bias as drawing just one
bead before making a decision. They observed a linear trend with increasing levels of psychosis
risk associated with an increasing percentage of participants showing the bias. They concluded
that there was a dose-response relationship between delusional intensity and level of JTC-bias.
Balzan et al. (2012) found a similar stepped increase over three groups of increasing risk.
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However, three studies have found results which support a different interpretation. Warmans
et al. (2007); Freeman et al. (2010) and Ho Wai So and Kwok (2015) all stratified participants
into three groups, and found that the JTC bias was less prevalent among the “middle” group
(delusion prone) than among the healthy controls. This pattern of results suggests that there may
not be a straightforward linear relationship between increasing levels of delusional intensity and
the jumping to conclusions bias. One potential explanation for this is that while the presence of a
first factor may be sufficient to elevate a person’s “delusion proneness”, the presence of a second
factor (i.e. a data-gathering bias) is required for the delusion to attain the full intensity required to
cross over into clinical relevance. Under such circumstances we might expect “delusion-prone”
individuals to manifest normal, or even enhanced inferential abilities. Such intact inferential
capacity could act as protective; ensuring that people who are delusion prone in virtue of the
presence of a first factor do not become fully delusional. This offers a potential hypothesis for
the relationship between aberrant salience and JTC as interacting components of clinically
significant delusions. If the absence of a second factor distinguishes clinical delusions from at
risk states then we might expect to see a pattern where a candidate second factor (in this case
JTC) moderates the relationship between a candidate first factor (in this case AS) such that an
association between AS and clinically significant delusional ideation is present only when a JTC
bias is also present.
2.5. Predictions and Hypotheses
The research and theory which has been reviewed here suggests that both aberrant
salience and a “jumping to conclusions” bias may play a role in attenuated psychotic symptoms.
These have never been investigated thoroughly in the context of the same study. Roiser et al.
(2009) did include an “easy” 60:40 version of the beads task in their examination of the SAT,
finding no association between experimentally assessed aberrant salience and a jumping to
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conclusions bias. However, their study also failed to replicate the well-established JTC bias in
schizophrenia patients relative to controls, so it could be that their small sample size lacked the
power to detect such an effect. It thus remains unknown precisely in what manner aberrant
salience and hasty decision-making might be expected to relate to psychotic symptomatology as
distinctive “factors” in a multifactorial process.
Previous research suggests that aberrant salience and the JTC bias are both associated
with attenuated psychotic symptoms, with the JTC bias also associated more specifically with
delusions (Garety et al., 2013), and with “delusional intensity” in an “at risk” group (Broome et
al., 2007). Thus the simplest possible outcome of the present study is that these two variables
make an independent contribution to psychotic symptoms, i.e. both aberrant salience and the JTC
bias will be associated with a high level of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms, but aberrant
salience and JTC will not be correlated with each other.
However, the two factor theory would predict that aberrant salience and the JTC bias
could interact with one another such that the contribution of aberrant salience will be necessary
but not sufficient to generate attenuated psychotic symptoms. Thus the association between
aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms would be expected to be stronger under
conditions where the jumping to conclusions bias is also present than when it is not. The stability
of performance on non-emotionally salient versions of the beads task, combined with its apparent
immunity to antipsychotic treatment, suggests the possibility that the jumping to conclusions bias
is a trait-like feature of reasoning in comparison to the more state like experience of aberrant
salience, thought to be influenced by dynamic changes in neuromodulation.
These alterative possible relationships give rise to the following specific predictions and
hypotheses:
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HYP 1: Individuals who display a high number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms
will demonstrate a high degree of aberrant salience and a “jumping to conclusions” bias
relative to control participants who display a lower number of such symptoms.
HYP 2: Individuals high in attenuated psychotic symptoms will show greater levels of
aberrant salience, but this will be moderated by a “jumping to conclusions” style of
reasoning, such that the positive association between high aberrant salience and attenuated
psychotic symptoms will be stronger for individuals with high levels of JTC than
individuals with low levels of JTC.
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Chapter 3: Method
3.1. Overview
The present study was a quasi-experimental, between group procedure, comparing the
performance of a “high PQ” group and a “low PQ” group (see below for definitions of these
groups) on measures of aberrant salience and jumping to conclusions bias. To control for the
possibility that behavioral measures of aberrant salience are confounded by a difficulty with
cognitive fluidity and task switching, the Trail Making Task was also administered.
3.2. Participants
The Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ) had been administered to a large sample of
undergraduates as part of an ongoing longitudinal study examining distressing attenuated
positive psychotic symptoms (DAPPS) in the context of a range of social and demographic
factors. The PQ provides a continuous outcome variable (the absolute number of attenuated
symptoms endorsed), but his sample can also be separated into two groups; one of “high” scoring
and one of low scoring individuals on the PQ. Conventions have not been established for
determining how to divide samples using this measure, but a sensitivity and specificity analysis
performed by Loewy et al. (2005) suggested that endorsing 8 items or predicted at risk status
with 90% sensitivity and 49% specificity. Thus the “high” scoring group in the current study was
defined in terms of anyone endorsing 8 or more distressing positive symptom items. The “low”
scoring group was defined in terms of anyone endorsing fewer items than the sample mean PQitems endorsed. 32 participants were recruited from the former group and 30 from the latter.
3.3. Materials
3.3.1. Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI)
The Aberrant Salience inventory is a 29-item measure which assesses subjective
experiences of aberrant salience attribution. Cicero et al. (2010) reported good overall internal
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consistency for their scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89) and, in terms of construct validity, found
positive correlations with other psychotic-like experiences scales; the Magical Ideation Scale
(r=0.55), the Perceptual Aberration Scale (r=0.47), the Referential Thinking Scale (r=0.41). In
contrast to these convergences, Cicero et al. found a relatively low correlation between their
measure and the Social Anhedonia Scale (r=0.17) which they took to indicate that the ASI also
demonstrated good divergent validity. Further construct validation was pursued by dividing
participants into high and low groups on existing psychosis proneness measures (the Magical
Ideation Scale or the Perceptual Aberration Scale) to determine whether membership of a
psychosis proneness group, defined by high scoring on these, also predicted ASI scores. They
found that the psychosis proneness group had far higher scores on the ASI than either a healthy
control group, or a “social anhedonia” group (defined by high scores on a measure of nonpositive schizotypal symptomatology). Every affirmative answer on the ASI added a 9% increase
in the odds of being in the psychosis proneness group. Cicero et al. derived 5 factors from the
ASI, which they labeled Increased Significance (e.g. item 10: “Do you ever feel the need to
make sense of seemingly random situations or occurrences?”); Senses Sharpening (e.g. item 12:
“Do you sometimes feel that you can hear with a greater clarity?”); Impending Understanding
(e.g. item 17: “Do you sometimes feel like you are on the verge of figuring out something really
big or important, but you aren’t sure what it is?”); Heightened Emotionality (e.g. item 20: “Do
you go through periods in which you feel overstimulated by things or experiences that are
normally manageable?”), and Heightened Cognition (e.g. item 25: “Do you sometimes feel like
the world is changing and you are searching for an explanation?”).
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The ASI yields a total score out of 29 (a higher score corresponds to greater degree of
aberrant salience) derived from yes/no responses to 29 statements. The current study confirmed
the high internal consistency of this measure (Cronbach’s alpha=0.91).
3.3.2. Salience Attribution Test (SAT)
The SAT (Roiser, 2009, Schmidt and Roiser, 2009) is an implicit learning paradigm in
which participants are shown a series of trials. In each trial a fixation cross appears briefly,
followed by an image at the top and bottom of the screen. The images they see are of household
objects or of animals, and they can be blue or red, providing four “dimensions” (red; blue;
household object; animal) which will be the “task relevant” dimension on any given trial. The
images stay on screen, but after a variable time delay (between 1000 and 2000 milliseconds) a
probe image (a black square) appears (for a variable time, clustering around a mean times which
is equal to participants’ average reaction time during a brief preliminary practice trial), upon
which participants have to press a single response key ("space") as quickly as possible. They are
told in advance that on some portion of the trials there is a financial reward for this response, and
that this will vary with the speed with which they can make it, but they are not told on which
trials this financial reward occurs. In Roiser et al.’s original version, this financial reward accrues
to a real payment given to participants at the end of the test. Local ethics considerations mean
that in the present study participants were told that they were accruing a reward, but in reality
they were given the same (maximally possible) amount of $20 for participation. In any given
block of the experiment (each participant completes two blocks of 64 trials), one of these
dimensions (e.g. "red") is financially rewarded 87.5% of the time while the other (e.g. "blue") is
rewarded 12.5% of the time. The dimension being rewarded varies from block to block.
Participants’ reaction times in response to the black-square probe are recorded. The expectation
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is that participants learn implicitly which dimension (e.g. "redness") is being rewarded and show
a faster response to “task-relevant” (e.g. red) objects during that block.
At the end of each block, participants are asked to use a sliding scale to rate the
percentage likelihood of a reward for each different type of object (i.e. they are asked "on what
percentage of trials were you rewarded for blue objects/red objects/animals/household objects?")
They are given a sliding scale for each to rate the likelihood, this scale yields a continuous
outcome measure of 1-100.
The Salience Attribution Test thus yields two forms of data, implicit (reaction time) data, and
explicit (visual analogue scale) data. These in turn are used to calculate four outcome variables
on which groups can be compared:
1. Implicit (Reaction Time) adaptive salience. This is attained by calculating the absolute
difference in reaction time between rewarded and non-rewarded trials. Roiser et al. (2009) do not
report a normative optimal “score”, but if a significant difference arises between groups on this
variable, it is indicative that (a) group(s) with a lower degree of implicit adaptive salience is not
relatively “speeding” toward the financially rewarded trials as much as (an)other group(s).
2. Explicit (sliding scale-rating) adaptive salience. This variable is derived in a very
similar way to implicit adaptive salience, by calculating the absolute difference in percentage
ratings (as opposed to reaction times) given on the visual analogue scale between rewarded and
non-rewarded trials. As with implicit adaptive salience, it allows for groups to be compared in
terms of their sense of which dimension of objects came to have a “significant” feeling through
their association with reward, but instead of being measured through “speeding” in reaction
times, is measured through subjective judgments of how often rewards were provided.
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3. Implicit (Reaction Time) aberrant salience. This variable is the putatively pathological
counterpart to implicit adaptive salience, representing instead the tendency to assign salience
inappropriately to objects. It is attained by calculating the difference in average reaction times
between the different non-rewarded trials, which ought to be approximately equal. If a positive
value is found for the difference in reaction times between types of non-rewarded domain (i.e. if
the person shows a specific pattern of speeding to "household" objects vs. “animals” on trials
where a color, “redness”, or “blueness” is being rewarded) then aberrant salience can be said to
be present. Groups can then be compared in terms of the degree of aberrant salience they
demonstrate relative to comparison groups.
4. Explicit (sliding scale) aberrant salience. This variable is derived in a directly
analogous way to implicit aberrant salience, by calculating any absolute positive difference
between levels of the task-irrelevant stimuli. (i.e. does a participant person rate "blue" as more
highly likely to be rewarded than “red” when in fact neither is rewarded for that block?)
However, unlike implicit aberrant salience, which is derived by calculating any difference
between reaction times, explicit aberrant salience is obtained by examining differences between
visual analogue scale ratings given by participants to these task-irrelevant stimuli at the end of
each block.
Roiser et al. (2009) did not find any significant group differences in reaction time
between controls and medicated schizophrenia patients, though there was a non-significant trend
in this direction. This finding suggests that a group difference in reaction time is unlikely in the
case of a less severe psychological disorder.
3.3.3. Jumping to Conclusions Bias (The “Beads Task”)
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In order to examine the presence of a hasty inferential style (or a “jumping to conclusions
bias”), in the present study participants completed the easy and difficult versions of the
computerized beads task (Garety et al., 2013). Participants are shown a picture of two jars
containing 85 beads of one color and 15 of another (easy version) or 60 of one color and 40 of
the other (difficult version). They are then told that one of the jars has been chosen at random
and that now beads are going to be drawn from it. Each bead will be replaced, so the proportions
will remain the same. Participants are told that their job is to decide which jar the beads are
coming from, and that they can see as many beads as they like before deciding. As beads are
shown, the previously drawn sequence of beads is also visible at the bottom of the page to act as
a memory aid. Following most studies using this measure, the presence of a JTC bias was
defined by requesting two or fewer beads. To control for potentially confounding practice
effects, the order of presentation of difficult and easy versions was counterbalanced within
groups in the present study.
3.3.4. Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ)
A range of psychometric and structured clinical interview measures exist to diagnose
high risk states, many of which were developed to facilitate enhanced clinical care of this
population. However, as Loewy et al. (2005) note, these have often been time consuming to
deploy, and have limited the speed with which new research can be produced. In order to address
this, Loewy and colleagues developed a 92-item self-report scale, the Prodromal Questionnaire
(PQ), adapting questions from existing measures of schizotypy, and structured clinical interviews
for high risk states (the PQ is regarded as having “descended from” Raine’s, 1991, Schizotypal
Personality Questionnaire and McGlashan et al.’s, 2010, SIPS, by having integrated information
from these measures, Daneault et al., 2013). 113 participants completed the PQ and the
Structured Interview for Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS). It was found that the positive symptom
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subscale successfully predicted the presence of a SIPS-diagnosed prodromal syndrome,
suggesting that the PQ has convergent validity with a “gold standard” (Loewy et al., 2005)
diagnostic instrument. On the basis of these results, Loewy et al. concluded that the presence of 8
or more “attenuated positive psychotic symptoms” (APPS) on the PQ was a sensitive measure of
“high risk” state. Subsequent work has yielded a briefer version of the PQ (Loewy et al. 2011),
and this has been subsequently shown to also have good sensitivity in follow up studies (Kline et
al., 2015).
3.3.5. Trail Making Task
Participants completed the Trail Making Task from the Delis-Kaplan Executive-Function
System (DKEFS, Delis et al., 2001) to control for the possibility that performance on the SAT is
a function of an individual’s capacity for task switching. Participants completed a number of
different conditions. In condition 2, participants trace a pencil line as quickly as possible
connecting 16 circles labelled one to 16 while ignoring distractors. In condition 3 participants
trace a pencil line as quickly as possible connecting 16 circles labelled A to P while ignoring
distractors. In condition 5, participants follow a similar procedure, tracing a line to join circles in
a sequential order, but are required to switch between circles labelled with letters and circles
labelled with numbers. It has been shown that the TMT provides a valid index of an individual’s
capacity to deploy executive functioning in the service of task switching (Arbuthnott and Frank,
2000).
3.4. Procedure
Data collected as part of an ongoing study of distressing attenuated positive psychotic
symptoms (DAPPS) were reviewed. Participants who fell into the “low” and “high” PQ-defined
groups (see section on participants, above) were contacted by phone to participate in an
experimental procedure. Participants were briefed and asked to sign a consent form. They then
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completed the Salience Attribution Test on a computer, the Trail Making Task, and a
computerized version of the beads task. The entire procedure took around 90 minutes to
complete. The Salience Attribution Test included a tutorial element, with three short blocks of
learning trials (following the instructions provided by Roiser et al., 2009) to prepare participants
for the task.
3.5. Data Analysis: Testing the Hypotheses
HYP 1: Individuals who display a high number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms/high
levels of delusional ideation will demonstrate a high degree of aberrant salience and a “jumping
to conclusions” bias relative to control participants who display a lower number of such
symptoms.
HYP 2: There will be a positive association between aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic
symptoms, and this will be moderated by a “jumping to conclusions” style of reasoning, such
that individuals with high levels of JTC will show an association between high aberrant salience
and attenuated psychotic symptoms. Individuals with low levels of JTC will show less of an
association between aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms.
To test these hypotheses participants in the “high” and “low” scoring group on the PQ
and were compared in terms of their scores on the measures of aberrant salience and jumping to
conclusions. Multiple t-tests allowed the comparison of these two groups on the main variables
of interest. Logistic regression allowed for the investigation of the contribution of the main
variables for predicting membership of the low and the high groups, and also for the examination
of any potential interaction between aberrant salience and jumping to conclusions.
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Chapter 4: Results
This study sought to examine the relationship between aberrant salience, a probabilistic
reasoning (“jumping to conclusions”) bias, and the presence of distressing attenuated positive
psychotic symptoms (DAPPS). Specifically, it sought to examine whether there is a relationship
between salience processing and attenuated positive psychotic symptoms and whether that
association is moderated by a hasty reasoning style, such that the aberrant salience-DAPPS
association is stronger when there is evidence of hastier style of reasoning.
4.1. Preliminary Analyses
4.1.1. Demographic Characteristics of the sample
Sixty-two undergraduate males and females aged 18 to 35 years participated in this study.
This was a sample of racial/ethnic minorities that was predominately Asian and Hispanic, with a
higher proportion of female than male participants. Just over 16% of the sample reported an
ethnic background other than Asian, Black or Hispanic. This approximately reflects the
demographic makeup of the urban public school system from which the sample was recruited.
Participants were recruited from a larger ongoing study and screened based on how many
Distressing Attenuated Positive Psychotic Symptoms (DAPPS) they endorsed on the Prodromal
Questionnaire (PQ) in that dataset. Individuals who endorsed four or fewer DAPPS were
considered “low” scorers. Individuals who scored eight or more DAPPS were considered “high”
scorers. There were initially 32 low PQ scorers recruited, and 30 high PQ scorers recruited to
the present study.
Due to a problem with the computer program that ran the SAT, response times of 16/62
participants were only partially recorded, substantially biasing SAT data for these participants.
This left a sample of 46 participants for whom full data were available. Because of the extent of
SAT data lost, it was regarded as safer to exclude these participants altogether from analyses that
46

required this information, rather than impute missing data. As can be seen in Table. 1. the sample
for whom full SAT data was not available was demographically similar to the original group.
However Hispanic students were over-represented among those who were missing. It is not clear
why this is.
Table 1-Demographic Characteristics of the sample, including those with SAT data, compared
with those missing SAT data.
Sample with SAT

Group Missing SAT

Original Overall

data (N=46)

data (N=16)

Sample (N=62)

20.7 (3.4) 18-35

20.63 (2.94)

20.5 (3.33) 18-35

Male

21 (45.7%)

6 (37.5%)

27 (43.5%)

Female

25 (54.3%)

10 (62.5%)

35 (56.5%)

Hispanic

16 (34.8%)

11 (68.75%)

27 (43.5%)

Black

8 (17.4%)

2 (12.5%)

10 (16.1%)

Asian

14 (30.4%)

2 (12.5%)

16 (25.8%)

Other

8 (17.4%)

1 (6.25%)

9 (14.5%)

Age Mean (SD) minmax

Race/Ethnicity N (%)

4.1.2. Clinical characteristics of the sample
4.1.2.1. DAPPS and total “PQ Positive” score:
This section presents detailed data about the average number of DAPPS endorsed by the
low and high PQ groups. In this study, a cut score of 4 or fewer was used to determine the low
group, and 8 or more was used to determine the high group. These scores are based specifically
on the number of distressing positive symptoms endorsed by participants. In the table below,
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data are also provided on the mean total number of positive symptoms endorsed altogether
(“total PQ positive), to provide further information about how many attenuated positive
psychotic experiences (including those that were not identified as distressing) were reported by
each group.
Table 2-Total number of DAPPS, and total number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms
(APPS) endorsed by the High and Low groups:

Mean Total

High (n=32)

Low (n=30)

10.03 (5.5)

2.86 (4.19)

DAPPS (SD)
Mean Total

37.63 (22.45) 18.41 (19.63)

Positive PQ (SD)
4.1.2.2. PQ/RT correlation and group TMT comparison
Dividing a sample based on a putative clinical characteristic raises the possibility of
results being confounded by a systematic difference other than the variable of interest. It may be
that a group that is elevated in terms of a clinical variable (in this case attenuated positive
psychotic symptoms) is also different in terms of their overall reaction times, or in terms of their
capacity to rapidly switch set. As these variables are potential confounds for the current study,
they were examined prior to the main analyses.
Any systematic difference in reaction times, with the High group performing more slowly
than the Low, might represent a confound in a measure involving group comparisons based on
reaction time data. Bivariate Pearson correlations were conducted to assess whether slower
reaction times to high validity SAT items was associated with higher levels of total attenuated
positive symptoms, or with distressing attenuated positive symptoms. These analyses revealed
extremely small correlations with none coming close to significance. Participants reporting
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higher rates of attenuated positive symptomatology did not show any tendency to respond less
quickly to high validity items than those reporting lower rates. These results are displayed in
table. 3.
Table 3-Bivariate Pearson correlations between block 1 and block 2 reaction times, and Total
number of DAPPS, and total number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms (APPS):
Total Attenuated Positive Psychotic

Distressing Attenuated Positive

Symptoms

Psychotic Symptoms

Block 1

r=-0.105, n=46, p=0.489

r=0.108, n=46, p = 0.474

Block 2

r=-0.154, n=46, p=0.306

r=0.03, n=46, p = 0.842

The SAT involves the capacity to switch effectively from responding to one rewarded
stimulus in Block 1 to a new rewarded stimulus in Block 2. A specific cognitive deficit in the
capacity to switch sets would thus present a potential confound. To control for this, High and
Low groups were compared on their performance on Trail Making Test number 4 in the Delis–
Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) battery. This specific subtest assesses for an
individual’s capacity to rapidly switch sets. No significant differences were found between low
and high groups (67.8s and 58.23s respectively) in terms of their performance on Trail Making
test (t [45]=1.35, p=0.18), suggesting that the groups’ capacity to deploy executive functioning
skills to shift set was not a confound for any group differences in terms of the SAT.
4.1.3. Descriptive data
4.1.3.1. Descriptive Salience Attribution Test (SAT) data:
If participants responded in less than 100ms this was considered a premature response
and excluded from analysis, following the precedent set by Roiser et al. (2009). Examination of
individual level reaction time distributions revealed a consistent pattern of positive skew.
Following the procedure detailed by Field (2005), skewness data were divided by the standard
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error of skewness to produce a z-score. Individual distributions all showed a value greater than
1.96, suggesting the presence of significant positive skew. To address this issue, all RT data
were log transformed prior to analysis. Statistical analyses of RT data (presented in Primary
Analyses section, below) are based on the log transformed data. However, for clarity
untransformed mean RTs are presented throughout.
4.1.3.2 Summary descriptive SAT data, current and previous studies:
Descriptive results are presented for the salience attribution test, following the convention
of Roiser et al. (2009). The 128 trials of the SAT are broken down into two blocks of 64, with
different dimensions of the stimulus rewarded in each block. This division of the task into Block
1 and Block 2 provides a way to examine whether participants are able to effectively re-learn a
new set of contingencies, and switch to a new pattern of salience attribution. First overall mean
reaction times for the entire sample are presented in Table 6. Then summary RT data from
previous published studies are presented to give context to the present data.
4.1.3.3. Implicit (RT) salience data broken down by block and low/high classification:
The following series of tables provides descriptive SAT data, broken down into low/high
DAPPS group comparisons. In the first table, Mean and SD reaction time data are provided for
the low and the high group in Block 1, Block 2 and overall.
Table 4-Reaction time data by group and block
Low (n=26)

High (n=20)

Mean RT

SD

Mean RT

SD

Block 1

262.01

57.56

262.53

40.59

Block 2

264.51

57.45

260.65

42.64

Overall

261.59

55.60

261.59

40.13
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These data are somewhat different from previous studies reporting SAT reaction times.
The low group in the present study showed slower reaction times than previously reported
control groups, and the high group showed quicker reaction times than previously reported
schizophrenia groups (see Table 5).
Table 5-Summary reaction time data by group from previous studies:
Control

Experimental (designation)

Schmidt and Roiser (2009)

233.86ms

(n/a)

Roiser et al. (2009)

252.9ms

283.35ms (DSM IV schizophrenia)

Abboud et al. (2016)

245.67ms

359.06ms (DSM IV schizophrenia &
“persistent delusions”)

In the following tables SAT reaction times for the entire sample are broken down by
block (i.e., Block 1 = the first 64 trials, Block 2 = the second 64 trials) and by the different levels
of stimulus “validity.” High validity trials are those on which the stimulus was associated with a
reward. Low validity trials are those on which it was not.
Table 6 -Summary reaction time data by group, block and stimulus validity:
Mean RT (milliseconds)

Standard Deviation

Block 1 High Validity

261.70

49.96

Block 1 Low Validity

262.77

52.72

Block 2 High Validity

259.80

50.85

Block 2 Low Validity

265.87

55.30

Overall High Validity

260.75

48.26
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Overall Low Validity

264.32

51.33

Stimuli were colored either red or blue, and were either animals or household objects.
Out of these four stimulus features, one feature (e.g., animals) would be rewarded; while the
other dimension (e.g., household objects) would not be. This yields reaction times to four
different types of stimulus (red animals and blue animals; red household objects and blue
household objects). From these reaction times, estimates of salience attribution can be derived.
The reaction times are further broken down and presented in two further tables below, using the
terminology coined by Roiser et al. (2009). This terminology is explained through an example.
In any given block, if red objects are rewarded, color is the relevant stimulus feature. Red
objects are high validity stimuli, and blue objects low validity stimuli. Subtracting the former
from the latter yields an estimate of implicit adaptive salience (a negative value would indicate
no speeding toward rewarded stimuli, and thus an absence of adaptive salience). The “task
irrelevant” dimension of the stimulus was the aspect of the stimuli that did not predict any
reward (in this example, content-i.e. whether the stimulus was an animal or a household object).
Any difference in reaction times between these two types of content (i.e. speeding toward
animals relative to household objects) would indicate the presence of aberrant salience. This was
assessed by averaging reaction times for the two different groups of task irrelevant stimuli and
subtracting the lower number (“task irrelevant low”) from the higher (“task irrelevant high”).
Figure 1 (below) provides a key to the calculation of adaptive and aberrant salience
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RTs to BLUE
stimuli

-

RTs to RED
stimuli

(Low Validity)

(High Validity)

RTs to whichever
task irrelevant
stimulus feature
was responded to
most slowly

RTs to whichever
task irrelevant
stimulus feature
was responded to
most quickly

-

(Task Irrelevant

(Task Irrelevant

High)

Low)

=

Adaptive Salience

=

Aberrant Salience

Figure 1-Calculating salience variables on the SAT.
In table 7, below, the data are further broken down by the different stimuli to which
participants responded. Reaction times are presented by block and validity level, and by block
and level of the task-irrelevant stimulus feature.
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Table 7- SAT reaction time data by group, block and stimulus validity
Low (n=26)

High (n=20)

Mean RT

SD

Mean RT

SD

Block 1 High Validity

263.03

55.94

259.98

42.32

Block 1 Low Validity

260.99

60.90

265.09

41.14

Block 2 High Validity

261.73

55.79

257.30

44.91

Block 2 Low Validity

267.30

62.93

264.01

45

Block 1 Irrelevant High 270.59

65.33

271.21

48.89

Block 1 Irrelevant Low

252.24

61.99

260.82

41.92

Block 2 Irrelevant High 268.25

57.86

272.07

50.81

Block 2 Irrelevant Low

266.76

76.14

255.66

48.86

Overall High Validity

262.38

53.59

258.64

41.57

Overall Low Validity

264.14

58.69

264.55

41.32

These differences allow for the calculation of the two forms of salience the SAT attempts
to measure (described above), which are presented in table 8, below.
Table 8-Implicit salience data by group and block

Block 1

Block 2

Low (n=26)

High (n=20)

Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms)

-2.03 (20.47)

5.11 (19.42)

Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms)

18.34 (35.01)

10.38 (37.7)

Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms)

5.57 (30.68)

6.7 (28.48)

Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms)

1.49 (47.93)

16.4 (41.97)
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4.1.3.4. SAT VAS Rating data:
In addition to reacting with a key press across 128 trials, participants are asked, at the end
of each block of 64 trials, to provide a subjective probability rating of how often they received
money for different types of stimuli (red/blue/animal/household object) on a visual analog scale
(VAS). Average VAS ratings for each group are presented in the tables below. VAS ratings were
made on a percentage scale, and thus ranged from 0-100.
Table 9-Overall VAS rating data by block and stimulus validity
Mean VAS Rating

Standard Deviation

Block 1 High Validity

63.80

15.79

Block 1 Low Validity

28.04

19.53

Block 2 High Validity

64.26

16.43

Block 2 Low Validity

35.17

18.06

Overall High Validity

64.03

11.53

Overall Low Validity

31.60

13.65

Explicit salience ratings can be derived from these figures in a manner analogous to the
derivation of implicit salience ratings. Subtracting average Low Probability ratings from average
High Probability ratings yields a measure Roiser et al. (2009) term explicit adaptive salience.
Subtracting average ratings for one level of the task irrelevant stimulus from the other yields a
measure of explicit aberrant salience. These derived salience figures are presented in the tables
below.
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Explicit (VAS Rating) Behavioral Salience data for the SAT:
Table 10-VAS rating and explicit salience data by group, block and stimulus validity.

Block 1

Block 2

Low (n=26)

High (n=20)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

VAS High Probability

61.12 (16.28)

67.3 (14.8)

VAS Low Probability

25.88 (16.51)

30.85 (23.03)

VAS irrelevant “high”

59.62 (12.74)

56.05 (13.09)

VAS irrelevant “low”

40.54 (14.56)

40.6 (12.81)

Explicit Adaptive Salience

35.23 (27.42)

36.45 (30.88)

Explicit Aberrant Salience

19.07 (12.28)

15.45 (16.14)

VAS High Probability

62.77 (17.53)

66.20 (15.1)

VAS Low Probability

33.92 (19.09)

36.80 (16.96)

VAS irrelevant “high”

51.69 (17.81)

56.10 (17.88)

VAS irrelevant “low”

37.23 (17.56)

39.05 (17.95)

Explicit Adaptive Salience

28.84 (33.79)

29.4 (25.43)

Explicit Aberrant Salience

19.30 (22.02)

26.45 (21.55)

To assess whether the reward contingencies of the Salience Attribution Test had been
successfully learned by participants¸ paired samples t-tests were conducted on the difference
between overall High Validity reaction times, and overall Low Validity reaction times.
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Participants tended to respond more quickly to rewarded than to unrewarded stimuli, however,
this overall group difference in mean reaction times was not significant (t=-1.32 [df=45] p=0.19).
As expected, participants’ assigned significantly higher VAS ratings to rewarded stimuli
than to unrewarded stimuli. This difference was significant, t=11.02 (df=45) p < 0.001. This
pattern of results suggests that participants did not respond notably faster to rewarded stimuli
than unrewarded, and that reaction time (“implicit”) measures derived from the SAT in this study
may be insensitive to variations in salience attribution. However, despite this, participants appear
to have been reliably subjectively sensitive to which stimulus dimension was being rewarded.
Thus, the measures of explicit salience used in the following analyses can be regarded as valid.
4.2. Primary Analyses
4.2.1. Hypotheses:
This study sought to examine two hypotheses. The first was that individuals who display
a high number of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms would demonstrate a high degree of
aberrant salience and a “jumping to conclusions” bias relative to control participants displaying a
lower number of such symptoms. The second was that there would be a positive association
between aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms, and this would be moderated by a
“jumping to conclusions” style of reasoning, such that individuals with high levels of JTC would
show an association between high aberrant salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms.
Individuals with low levels of JTC would show less of an association between aberrant salience
and attenuated psychotic symptoms.
4.2.2. Testing the Hypotheses
To explore whether group membership had any impact on salience processing across time
(i.e., whether participants in one group showed a tendency toward improved learning of the
contingencies relative to the other group), transformed reaction time data were entered into a
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mixed ANOVA, with Block (1 vs. 2) and Validity (High vs. Low) as within subjects factors, and
DAPPS high/low group as the between subjects factor. There were no significant main effects
and no significant interactions, suggesting that there were no systematic differences between the
groups, either in terms of how they implicitly learned the contingencies, or the extent to which
they improved over time.
To explore differences between the task-irrelevant levels of the stimulus over time (i.e.,
changes in aberrant salience), reaction time data were entered into another mixed ANOVA
model, with Block (1 vs. 2) and Mean RT to the two validity levels of the task-irrelevant
stimulus (High vs. Low) as within subjects factors, and DAPPS group as the between subjects
factor. There were no main effects but there was an interaction with significance (F=6.131, 1, 44,
p = 0.01).
In order to understand the nature of the interaction, aberrant salience reaction time
patterns were graphed for high and low DAPPS groups and presented in Figure 1. The graphed
interaction between task irrelevant high and low reactions times for Block 1 and Block 2 were
graphed for high and low DAPPS groups. The pattern suggests a difference in the degree to
which high and low DAPPS groups assigned aberrant salience over time. Namely, these graphs
reveal that low PQ individuals showed a tendency toward responding equally quickly to both
levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus over time suggesting a decrease in aberrant salience (i.e., a
tendency to display less aberrant salience by not responding faster to one unrewarded stimulus
feature than another). However, the high PQ or DAPPS group did not show this pattern, and
showed a consistent difference in how quickly they responded between the two levels of the
category that was not being rewarded over time. This finding represents preliminary evidence for

58

an improvement in learning in the low group that was not found in the high group, which may
represent improved salience processing in the former.

High PQ Aberrant Salience

Low PQ Aberrant Salience
290
280
270
260
250
240
230
220

290
280
270
260
250
240
230
Block 1
Task Irrelevant high

Block 1

Block 2

Task Irrelevant high

Task Irrelevant low

Block 2
Task Irrelevant low

Figure 2-Reaction time data for implicit aberrant salience
To explore whether there were differences between rewarded and unrewarded trials, and
whether these were larger among the High DAPPS than the Low DAPPS participants, VAS
rating data were entered into a mixed ANOVA, with Block (1 vs. 2) and Validity (High vs. Low)
as within subjects factors, and group as the between subjects factor. There was a significant main
effect of block (F=4.86, 1,44, p=0.03), and validity (F=117.39, 1,44, p<0.01). Examination of the
low and high groups’ VAS ratings graphed by, block and validity (Figures 3 and 4) suggest that
both DAPPS groups consistently and correctly rated high validity stimuli as more likely to have
been rewarded relative to low validity trials, and that this accounts for the significant main effect
of validity. The significant main effect of block was explored with post-hoc paired sample t-tests
examining VAS ratings across DAPPS groups. Low Validity ratings for block 1 and Block 2,
and High Validity ratings for block 1 and Block 2 were compared in two paired samples t-tests.
In neither case was the difference across blocks significant. However, when Low and High VAS
ratings are averaged together to create two overall (Block 1 and Block 2) VAS ratings variables,
there was a significant difference between blocks (t=2.33, df=45, p=0.02). Overall, participants’
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ratings increased from Block 1 (mean VAS 45.92, sd=10.50) to Block 2 (mean VAS 49.71,
sd=8.43). Examination of figure 2 below suggests that this effect was mainly driven by an
overall tendency toward rating low validity stimuli as more frequently rewarded on the second
block than on the first. The resultant slight narrowing of the gap between high and low validity
VAS ratings from block to block suggests a decrease in adaptive salience. This probably results
from participants having to switch to learning a new set of contingencies in the second block (i.e.
learning that a different stimulus characteristic was being rewarded). There were no significant
interactions.

High PQ Adaptive
Salience

80

VAS Percentage Rating

VAS Percemtage Rating

Low PQ: Adaptive
Salience
60
40
20
0
Block 1

Block 2

Block
High Validity

80
60
40
20
0
Block 1

Block
High Validity

Low Validity

Block 2

Low Validity

Figure 3-VAS Rating data for explicit adaptive salience
To explore differences in explicit ratings between the task-irrelevant levels of the
stimulus from Block 1 to Block 2 (i.e. changes in explicit aberrant salience), reaction time data
were entered into another mixed ANOVA model, with Block (1 vs. 2) and VAS ratings to the
two levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus (High vs, Low) as within subjects factors, and DAPPS
group as the between subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of Validity (F=93.77, 1,
45, p < 0.01). There were no other significant main effects or interactions. This result suggests
that both groups showed some degree of aberrant salience (i.e. not showing the rationally optimal
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pattern of rating both levels of the task irrelevant stimulus as equally likely to yield a reward.)
Examination of Figs. 3 below suggests that, while the low PQ participants’ aberrant salience
remained stable from block to block, the high PQ participants showed an increase in aberrant
salience from Block 1 to Block 2. However, this effect falls short of significance (F=1.96, 1, 44,
p=0.28), and appears to be at least partly accounted for by a virtual absence of aberrant salience
in Block 1 among the High PQ participants.
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Irrelevant Low
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Figure 4-VAS Rating data for explicit aberrant salience
4.2.5. Self-Report Aberrant Salience Data
High PQ participants endorsed a mean of 16.75 out of 29 (SD= 7.8) items on the
Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI). Low PQ participants endorsed a mean of 10.88 (SD=6.3)
items. This difference was statistically significant (t=2.97, df=44, p=0.008).
4.2.6. Probabilistic Reasoning Data
The second hypothesis of this study was that the positive association between aberrant
salience and attenuated psychotic symptoms would be moderated by a “jumping to conclusions”
style of reasoning. The outcome variable for the probabilistic reasoning (beads) task was the
number of beads drawn before participants felt certain they knew which jar the beads were
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coming from. Mean draws to decision for each group are presented in table 11. During the
current study, additional qualitative observations were made of the approach participants took to
completing this reasoning task. These observations raise some questions for the traditional
interpretation of beads-task results, and are included in Appendix A.
Table 11-Mean Draws to Decision (DTD) for “high” and “low” groups:
High (n=33)

Low (n=29)

85:15 mean DTD (SD)

7.5 (4.3)

6.4 (3.7)

60:40 mean DTD (SD)

10.7 (3.7)

9 (3.2)

Participants were administered the two versions of the beads task, the standard 85:15
version and the more difficult 60:40 version. The latter is harder because it requires participants
to make a discrimination about a less obvious difference in quantities of beads. Both versions
were administered because the 60:40 version is regarded as sensitive to less marked differences
between groups (Broome et al. 2007). Very few participants in this sample displayed the JTC
bias drawing 3 beads or fewer and there were no statistically significant differences between the
high and low DAPPS groups on mean DTD.
4.2.7. Group differences and interaction effects between the two factors
To assess for DAPPS high vs low group differences on the test variables, multiple
independent t-tests were conducted to compare group (high vs. low) means for VAS adaptive
salience block 1, VAS adaptive salience block 2, VAS aberrant salience block 1, VAS aberrant
salience block 2 the ASI, the 85:15 version of the beads task and the 60:40 version of the beads
task. A Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple (7) comparisons, so that the threshold for
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a significant finding was a p-value of 0.007. Results of multiple comparisons are shown in table
6 below.
Table 12-Multiple t-tests of group mean differences on five test variables:
Variable

t-value

p-value

ASI Mean score

2.97 (df=44)

0.008*

Beads (85:15)

.867 (df=60)

0.38

Beads (60:40)

1.407 (df=60)

0.16

VAS adaptive Salience B1

0.142 (df=44)

0.89

VAS aberrant Salience B1

.866 (df=44)

0.39

VAS adaptive Salience B2

0.61 (df=44)

0.95

VAS aberrant Salience B2

1.1 (df=44)

0.27

*=significant at p=0.007.
The only significant difference between groups was on mean total ASI score, suggesting
that the groups here did not differ in terms of their draws to decision performance or their
aberrant salience attribution during a probabilistic learning task.
To test for the possibility that probabilistic reasoning moderates the association between
aberrant salience and DAPPS, two logistic regression analyses were completed, using ASI
aberrant salience and draws to decision for the two different versions of the beads task as
predictors. Self-reported experiences of aberrant salience were associated with increased odds of
belonging to the “high” DAPPS group, confirming the first hypothesis of the present study.
Draws to decision was not reliably associated with increased odds of belonging to the high
DAPPS group for either version of the beads task. To examine the interaction between aberrant
salience and performance on the beads task, a third variable was computed to represent the
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multiplicative term of aberrant salience and draws to decision on the beads task. The interaction
for both models was non-significant, suggesting that performance on the beads task does not
moderate the relationship between aberrant salience and DAPPS.
Table 13-Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant Salience (ASI)
and 85:15 Beads Task results:
OR

95% CI

b (SE)

P

Aberrant Salience (ASI)

1.12

1.02-1.23

0.12 (0.48)

0.01*

Beads 85:15

1.15

0.62-2.11

0.14 (0.31)

0.65

ASI*Beads 85:15

1.06

0.9-1.23

0.05 (0.07)

0.46

Table 14-Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant Salience (ASI)
and 60:40 Beads Task results:
OR

95% CI

b (SE)

P

Aberrant Salience (ASI) 1.12

1.02-1.23

0.12 (0.48)

0.01*

Beads 60:40

1.45

0.66-3.14

0.37 (0.39)

0.34

ASI*Beads 60:40

1.075

.935 - 1.235

0.07 (0.07)

0.31

This pattern of results suggests that probabilistic reasoning did not moderate the
association between aberrant salience and DAPPS in this sample. This finding is inconsistent
with the second hypothesis being examined here.
4.3. Secondary Analyses
4.3.1. DAPPS Instability
The results of this study show few significant differences between low and high DAPPS
participants on the measures of interest. This may partly result from an unexpected degree of
instability in DAPPS over time. There were initially 32 low PQ scorers recruited, and 30 high PQ
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scorers recruited to the present study. The PQ was administered to the current sample of
participants anywhere between two months up to a year prior to commencement of recruitment
for the present study. Given this time lag, all participants were administered the PQ a second
time at present study commencement to provide a current assessment of attenuated positive
psychotic symptomatology. Sixteen of the participants’ PQ scores at this second administration
led to different low/high classification, suggesting a degree of instability in attenuated symptoms
for around a quarter of participants.
As a result of this change, PQ status at the point of recruitment did not always reflect PQ
status at the point of the experiment. Given this fact, it was decided to explore, in secondary
analyses, whether there were differences between participants based on other more specific
derivations of PQ status that accounted for the time lag between recruitment and study
commencement. Two additional ways of classifying these participants in terms of PQ status are
possible. One is based on a simple re-classification, based on their most recent PQ score. Under
this classification, 29 participants reported four DAPPS or fewer when tested again at the point
of the experiment, falling into the “low” group (mean: 1.45 S.D: 1.52). Twenty-seven reported
eight or more DAPPS at the point of the experiment, falling into the “high” group (Mean: 12.44
SD: 4.33). 6 individuals fell into neither of the two a priori determined groups, scoring an
average of 6 DAPPS (SD: 2).
A second way to reclassify participants based on PQ status involves a longitudinal
consideration of an individual as being either stably-low, stably-high, or variable. Most
participants who moved, did so clearly from one category to another and were thus classified as
variable (and excluded from analyses). However, two participants endorsed eight or more
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DAPPS at time one, and seven or more at time two. To accommodate some minimal variability,
these were classified as stably high.
Table 15-Participants whose group status changed:
DAPPS at

DAPPS at

Direction of

Functional

recruitment

testing

change

Status

1

13

0

High to Low

Variable

2

15

0

High to Low

Variable

3

8

4

High to Low

Variable

4

12

3

High to Low

Variable

5

8

2

High to Low

Variable

6

10

4

High to Low

Variable

7

10

3

High to Low

Variable

8

9

7

High to Middle

Stable High

9

10

7

High to Middle

Stable High

10

9

6

High to Middle

Variable

11

2

7

Low to Middle

Variable

12

4

7

Low to Middle

Variable

13

2

16

Low to High

Variable

14

0

13

Low to High

Variable

15

2

9

Low to High

Variable

16

0

10

Low to High

Variable
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The analyses presented in the main body of this results section are based on PQ status at
the point of recruitment. However re-analyses for alternative groupings were also performed to
assess whether these different groupings had an impact on findings. Even with the division of the
sample into different low/high configurations, the results remained the same, with no significant
group differences in terms of the SAT salience variables, or draws to decision on the beads task.
The finding of a significant difference in self-report aberrant salience (ASI) was stable for each
of the other two possible configurations of low/high grouping. For the results pertaining to these
alternative groupings, see Appendix. B.
4.3.2. PQ/ASI divergent validity
To examine the convergent and divergent validity of the PQ and ASI, and explore the
extent to which they are different but related constructs, Pearson correlations between total
number of DAPPS and total ASI score across the entire sample were carried out. The number of
DAPPS correlated significantly with total ASI score (r=0.35, p=0.006). The total number of PQ
positive symptoms and the total ASI score also correlated significantly with total ASI score
(r=0.34, p=0.009). These correlations are significant, but only medium in terms of effect size.
This result suggests a robust association between these measures. However the association is less
than the 0.85 threshold suggested by Campbell and Fiske (1959) in their discussion of divergent
validity. This provides some tentative support for the hypothesis that the positive symptom scale
of the PQ and the ASI measure different underlying constructs, and is consistent with the
moderately sized correlations between the ASI and psychosis proneness measures examined in
Cicero et al. (2010). However this should be regarded as an exploratory and suggestive finding.
Further work is required to establish the divergent validity of the ASI.
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4.3.3. Exploratory SAT/ASI convergent validity
This is the first study to employ the two extant measures specifically designed to assess
aberrant salience attribution (the ASI and the SAT) and thus affords an opportunity to examine
their convergent validity. A correlation between two measures in such different domains (selfreport vs. experimental) would provide support for the assumption, present in the extant
literature, that they are both measuring the same phenomenon. To examine this aspect of
convergent validity, bivariate correlations were performed between Block 1 VAS Aberrant
Salience, Block 2 VAS Aberrant Salience, and Total ASI score. Block 1 VAS Aberrant Salience
actually correlated negatively with total ASI, though this effect was small and not statistically
significant (r=-0.178, n=46, p=0.236). However, Block 2 VAS Aberrant Salience showed a small
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positive, and statistically significant correlation with total ASI (r=0.385, n=46, p=.008).
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Figure 5-Scatterplots showing self-report aberrant salience (ASI) plotted VAS aberrant salience
for Block 1 (left) and Block 2 (right)
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The present study sought to investigate the relationship between two cognitive factors,
aberrant salience and the jumping to conclusions bias, and their relationship to clinically
significant attenuated positive psychotic symptoms. This was the first study to examine aberrant
salience using experimental and self-report methods, and the first to do so in a non-treatment
seeking population. Additionally it was the first study to examine aberrant salience experiences
and probabilistic reasoning together in the context of a multifactorial theory of psychosis. It was
hypothesized that individuals self-reporting a clinically significant number of positive psychoticlike symptoms would be more likely to exhibit the tendency to place salience on irrelevant
stimuli. This was supported in that high scoring individuals on a prodromal questionnaire scored
higher on an inventory of aberrant salience. Furthermore, using experimental methods, it was
found that self-reported, subjective feelings of sharpened senses and enhanced awareness
correlated with aberrant salience attribution on a rating scale during a behavioral task, in the
context of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms.
5.1. Summary of findings
The main finding from the present study was that individuals who endorse elevated levels
of distressing attenuated psychotic symptomatology tended to also report experiences of elevated
salience dysregulation than a group who reported only average levels of such symptoms. This
finding is consistent with Hypothesis one, and provides support for the proposed link between
psychosis and aberrant salience. However, contrary to previous studies that have deployed the
Salience Attribution Test in populations with psychotic symptoms or high risk states, and
contrary to what was hypothesized, this study did not find any associations between DAPPS and
any of the SAT outcome variables. The failure to find any such association is novel, and appears
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to contradict the aberrant salience hypothesis. Reasons for such a failure to replicate are explored
further below.
Contrary to one of this study’s main hypotheses, individuals with elevated attenuated
psychotic symptoms did not show a tendency to select fewer beads before drawing a conclusion
about which of two jars the beads were coming from, i.e., they did not show evidence of any
tendency towards a jumping to conclusions bias. Although this finding was not predicted, it is
consistent with an interpretation of the two-factor model, as will be discussed below in the
section Findings in Context. The lack of an association between DAPPS and draws to decision
on the beads task also meant that the third major hypothesis of the study was not confirmed:
there was no moderation of the relationship between aberrant salience and DAPPS by number of
beads drawn. Drawing fewer beads did not yield a stronger relationship between aberrant
salience and DAPPS.
5.2. Interpretation of findings
Overall the results discussed here are consistent with (but not strongly corroborative of) a
model in which distressing attenuated positive psychotic symptoms are associated with aberrant
salience; an inappropriate sense of subjective significance which may contribute to the
development of experiences like having a delusional belief, or seeing/hearing things which aren’t
there. However, the evidence is mixed. While the significant difference between experimental
groups on the self-report salience measure (the ASI) supports this interpretation, the absence of
any such difference on the experimental/behavioral measure (the SAT) does not. The mixed
pattern of findings regarding salience is open to several potential interpretations.
First, it may be that the ASI provides a more sensitive measure of salience processing
than the SAT, and that it is thus able to detect relatively small differences between the two
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groups examined here. In favor of this interpretation is the fact that the ASI relies on selfreported subjective experiences. The experiences in question are generally quite subtle in
character (e.g. “has your sense of taste ever seemed quite acute?”). It is prima facie plausible that
such subtle alterations in subjectivity could be present in non-clinical manifestations of
attenuated psychosis, without the additional presence of more pronounced cognitive distortions
of the sort that would give rise to differential performance on an experimental task. This
interpretation is also supported by the fact that the subjective VAS ratings in the SAT did show a
reliable difference between rewarded and unrewarded stimuli.
A second interpretation is that the implementation of the SAT in this study was flawed in
some way. In terms of reaction time, the overall sample did not show a tendency toward more
rapid responding to rewarded items, and did not show a pattern of “implicit adaptive salience.”
Such a finding limits the applicability of the reaction time results for understanding aberrant
salience, and may account for why there was no group difference in terms of implicit aberrant
salience. However, against this interpretation the rating scale results (explicit salience) did yield
a clear pattern of higher likelihood ratings for rewarded items, indicating successful attribution of
explicit adaptive salience among all participants, as expected. This suggests that, despite the
failure of the task to detect speeding toward rewarded stimuli, participants could reliably judge
which stimuli were being rewarded. The failure to detect a group difference in terms of explicit
aberrant salience on this measure is thus interpretable in terms other than the simple failure of the
SAT to accurately detect salience attribution.
A third interpretation is that the failure to find group differences on the SAT is a result of
Type-II error, as the sample size limited the power of the experiment to find any such effect.
This possibility (also discussed in the section on Limitations, below) cannot be corroborated or
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refuted. Even with the loss of power that resulted from the data loss, the sample size here is
similar in size to previous SAT studies that have found positive results.
The self-report and experimental rating-scale measures of aberrant salience were found to
be correlated (i.e. self-report aberrant salience correlated with Block 2 Explicit aberrant salience,
salience). This result provides some tentative support for the hypothesis that they are measuring
the same construct. The use of two approaches to measuring salience attribution represents a
strength of this study. No work has yet been conducted to examine subjective experiences of
aberrant salience while also investigating experimental attribution of salience. Future studies
could fruitfully set out to more explicitly examine the construct validity of aberrant salience by
examining the covariation of these alternate forms of assessing it.
In terms of incautious reasoning, the lack of a group difference on the beads task is
consistent with an interpretation on which high levels of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms
(which have not crossed the threshold into “full blown” psychosis) are not associated with more
hasty reasoning. In fact, the results here show a trend towards more beads being drawn by the
High PQ group on both variations of the task, a finding which runs contrary to that which was
expected. This null result is most parsimoniously interpreted as indicating the lack of any
difference in probabilistic reasoning between groups who are defined solely in terms of
attenuated symptomatology. Such a finding is consistent with an interpretation under which
probabilistic reasoning is not a relevant factor in determining whether people experience
attenuated psychotic symptomatology. Rather, such symptomatology may represent early
disturbances in perception and subjective self-experience, which are nonetheless still capable of
being “managed” by intact reality testing. This theoretical formulation is made explicitly by
Beck and Warman (2004), who suggest that cognitive insight is essential to the distinction
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between anomalous experiences and full blown psychosis. These authors place probabilistic
reasoning at the center of their view of insight, saying that this construct is “impeded by
premature closure (“jumping to conclusions”) and overconfidence in the rightness of […]
inferences” (p.85). This two-factor interpretation is also supported by previous studies, which
have found significant differences in neurocognitive performance between individuals who are in
an “at risk” state and individuals who have developed a full blown psychotic illness (Pukrop et
al., 2005). However there is also a substantial body of evidence to suggest that neuro-cognition
assessed longitudinally over the development of psychosis reveals no pattern of decline from
prodromal status to full blown illness (Bora and Murray, 2014). Such a pattern, when combined
with evidence for the stability of the JTC bias in deluded patients over time (Peters and Garety,
2006) suggests that differences in performance on such tasks may distinguish between
individuals likely to go on to develop psychosis and individuals who do not. Broome et al.
(2012) examined this directly by following up after two years with a small sample of at risk
individuals who had completed the 85:15 and 60:40 versions of the beads task at the start of the
study. They found no significant difference between those who had and those who had not
converted to psychosis, but their relatively small sample (28 individuals, five of whom had
developed psychosis) limits the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn from their
research. More research is needed on this question.
Considered alongside other similar findings with the beads task specifically, the present
result is consistent with the possibility that an “epistemological impulsivity” (Bentall, 2004)
associated with the jumping to conclusions bias could be an important factor in the development
of more severe forms of psychotic symptomatology. Qualitative examination of the experiences
of prodromal individuals is consistent with this suggestion. Investigators have suggested that the
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prodrome can entail preoccupation with analyzing the reality of overvalued ideas, suggesting a
degree of epistemic caution (the opposite of a Jumping to Conclusions bias) among these
individuals (Møller et al., 2000). For example, one of Møller et al.’s participants reported “I had
to define and analyze everything I was thinking about.” (p.222). In a more anecdotal vein, Aviv
(2010) said of a young patient that “she seemed to have come closer to psychosis than any other
patient I interviewed there, but she used a few shreds of logic to tether herself to reality.” (p.46).
A recent qualitative examination of the experiences of psychosis (Jones et al. 2015) also drew
attention to the apparently deliberate quality that psychosis can involve, and the importance of
applying deliberative reasoning to keep it in check. This experience should be explored in greater
detail in more rigorous qualitative studies. The possibility that beads-task performance is better
among “high risk” populations than in either psychotic or “low risk” samples is discussed further
below, in the section Results in Context.
5.3. Current Findings in Context
Previous studies of aberrant salience and probabilistic reasoning have largely treated
these factors individually. Although both variables (especially the latter) have been consistently
associated with various forms and degrees of psychotic experiences, they have not been explored
in combination with one another. Understanding how they might interact is of particular interest
for two reasons. The first is that they have each been incorporated into broad, multifactorial
theoretical models of psychosis which require multifactorial empirical testing. The second is that
the extent to which they are theoretically distinct remains poorly understood. It is possible that
aberrant salience and probabilistic reasoning are two sides of the same coin. For example,
aberrant salience attribution might lead to a premature cessation of bead selection because beads
are imbued with subjective explanatory significance before the point at which it is rational to
stop viewing them. However they may also represent unrelated cognitive abilities. This issue
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needs to be far better understood before the psychology of psychosis can be fully explicated. The
current findings potentially shed some light on the interplay of these two variables in the
production of attenuated psychotic symptoms, and their role can be even better understood by
comparing the present study to previous findings in the same field.
In this section, the current results are considered in the light of relevant previous findings.
The present finding of no group difference in SAT performance between low and high scorers on
the PQ is inconsistent with experimental studies that have found Aberrant Salience in “at risk”
type populations. Roiser et al. (2012) found that an Ultra High Risk (UHR) for psychosis group
scored significantly higher than controls on explicit aberrant salience as measured by the SAT.
This result stands in contrast to the present study. This inconsistency may reflect differences in
the respective samples. A clear difference between this study and that of Roiser at el. is in the
earlier study’s use of individuals who were (1) seeking mental health treatment, and (2)
diagnosed as being “high risk” by the Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental State
(CAARMS) criteria. This measure involves the use of a structured clinical interview to establish
who is at risk, setting a substantially higher threshold for inclusion in the at risk group. This
higher threshold for the “at risk” group might account for the difference between those and the
present results. However, it is also worth noting that two (out of 18) of Roiser et al.’s participants
had previously taken psychiatric medications, and that their engagement with mental health
services may be indicative of other differences in social/mental functioning that might have
contributed to their results. The use of psychiatric medications may have an impact on
processing speed and thus make experimental reaction times generally slower and more erratic.
The presence of clinically significant psychiatric symptomatology may be associated with group
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differences in attention or other executive functions. These might be expected to impact
performance in a task that draws on sustained vigilance, set shifting and working memory.
Haslegrove et al. (2015) examined aberrant salience in a college population that bore
more similarities to the present sample, and their findings would be expected to be similar to
those reported here. Haslegrove et al. assigned undergraduates to high/low groups on the basis of
their scores on a self-report measure of schizotypy, and administered tasks to assess for latent
inhibition, blocking, and learned irrelevance, three attentional learning phenomena that the
researchers posited were associated with salience regulation. While low schizotypy participants
demonstrated an attentional bias towards stimuli that were predictive of trial outcome, and faster
responses toward stimuli with predictive validity, high schizotypy participants did not show such
an effect. Although they did not employ the SAT, Haselgrove et al.’s study suggests that nonmedicated, non-helping seeking individuals who score high on measures of schizotypy do show
evidence of aberrant salience. This stands in contrast to the current study, lending support to the
possibility that the absence of a significant group difference in aberrant salience represents TypeII error.
Moving to previous studies that have looked at self-reported aberrant salience, the present
results fit with other literature using the same measure. In multiple studies, its authors have
found that self-reported aberrant salience is associated with elevated rates of psychotic like
experiences. (Cicero et al., 2010, 2013) The present results thus represent a modest replication of
these findings, adding to a picture in which aberrant salience plays an important role in early or
sub-clinical psychotic experiences.
In terms of the role of probabilistic reasoning (beads task performance), the present
results stand in contrast to several studies that have found an association between sub-clinical
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psychotic experiences and the jumping to conclusions bias (Broome et al. 2007, Bensi et al.,
2010, Cafferkey et al., 2014). However, they are also consistent with a small emerging literature
discussed in the Introduction that has examined beads task performance across the psychosis
spectrum (Warmans et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2010; Ho Wai So and Kwok, 2015). One
possible role for probabilistic reasoning as a second factor in psychosis, is that it provides a
check on anomalous experiences, to prevent them from being interpreted in a way that leads to
the development of delusional or hallucinatory experiences. If this is an accurate
characterization, we might expect to see a distinct pattern when we compare individuals across
the psychotic spectrum. Specifically, we might predict the least cautious reasoning style to be
shown by individuals with frank psychosis (who do not have anomalous experiences “reigned
in”), and the most cautious reasoning style to be seen in individuals with sub-clinical psychotic
experiences (who do have such experiences “reigned in” or reality tested). Individuals without
elevated levels of sub-clinical psychotic experiences might be expected to show probabilistic
reasoning that is intermediate between these extremes, or indistinguishable from sub-clinical
participants. As was outlined in the introduction to this study, this is precisely the pattern that has
been shown in the four previous studies that have examined this phenomenon. It is this pattern
that is consistent with the current results. The non-clinical group of psychosis-prone individuals
studied here did not demonstrate any tendency to “jump to conclusions” in a simple reasoning
task, despite displaying elevated levels of self-reported aberrant salience and distressing
attenuated positive psychotic symptoms. This pattern of results suggests a growing picture in
which clinically significant psychosis is distinguishable from psychotic-like phenomena by the
absence of probabilistic (reality testing) reasoning processes that act to protect an individual
from losing touch with reality.
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The nature of the sample in the current study is an important consideration when trying to
understand departures from previous studies. In contrast to many studies of undergraduate
populations, which draw on a predominantly white sample, the current study was predominantly
non-white and drawn from a population of first-generation college students from immigrant
families of lower socio-economic status. This may play a role in understanding why the present
administration of the SAT did not detect a difference in terms of reaction-time based adaptive
salience. However, it is also interesting to note that some of the outcomes in this study were
replications of previous findings. This extends these results into new terrain, with a
demographically broader sample.
5.4. Implications of the current findings
The finding that non-help seeking individuals who are high in DAPPS demonstrate
elevated levels of aberrant salience replicates previous work (Cicero et al., 2010, 2013,
Haslegrove et al., 2015) and provides further tentative support for the aberrant salience theory of
positive psychotic symptoms. The fact that this association is seen in a group of undergraduates
who were not recruited on the grounds of a clinical diagnosis or decline in social functioning
supports the putative specificity of the relationship between attenuated psychotic phenomena and
aberrant salience. This is not an association that is driven by incidental factors that have to do
with being clinically psychotic or taking psychiatric medications that target dopaminergic
neurons. Kapur’s theory predicts that aberrant salience should be present from early on in the
development of psychotic experiences, and that is corroborated by the current findings.
The findings in the current study provide some tentative support for a multi-factorial
theory of psychosis. The apparent lack of any association between the number of beads drawn,
and the presence of elevated levels of aberrant salience is concordant with a proposal that these
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two components are important contributors to the development of psychosis, but not sufficient in
isolation. Under the two-factor model, aberrant salience would provide experiential evidence
that something new and strange was happening, and would lead to the early, attenuated
experiences of oddness and difference that characterize prodromal or “psychosis-prone” states. A
separate deficit in evaluating evidence in an appropriately cautious way would contribute to the
acceptance or “incorporation” (e.g. Gerrans, 2014) of this evidence into a person’s view of
reality, in the form of accepting delusional beliefs or coming to believe that heard voices are
separate from oneself.
It is also consistent with an interpretation under which the contributions of aberrant
salience and probabilistic reasoning biases are distinct components. This runs contrary to single
factor models of psychosis such as the predictive coding framework (Griffin and Fletcher, 2017)
in which the deficits and symptoms of psychosis are explained by a generalized deficit in the
hierarchical prediction processes that allow the brain to make inferences about and update its
working model of reality. Under this latter framework, the experience of aberrant salience arises
from unresolved prediction error arising in neural perceptual and motor feedback systems.
5.5. Limitations
The current study suffers from a number of limitations. The most significant limitation
was the ultimate sample size of the study. An original sample of sixty-two participants was
reduced to forty-six by a programming error that led to a loss of data. The change in sample size
represents a loss of statistical power. To some minor extent, the issue of power is addressed by
the fact that multiple analyses, dividing the groups in different ways, all found similar results.
These re-analyses cannot stand as replications as they draw from the same sample, but the lack
of variation from analysis to analysis does suggest that the present findings are not merely driven
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by idiosyncratic extremes within the data set. More encouragingly, many of the results here are
consistent with previous studies, and make theoretical sense. However, the limited sample size
means that the study is potentially under-powered and that its results should be regarded as
preliminary and suggestive. The absence of significant group differences on salience attribution
may be the result of Type-II error.
Local ethics requirements meant that the financial reward component of the SAT in the
current study had to be implemented differently than in previous uses of the task. Previously
published studies using this measure have provided a financial reward to participants that is
determined by their performance on the task. The ethics committee that oversaw the current
study determined that the use of variable financial rewards was unethical. As an alternative,
participants were informed that their financial compensation would be determined by SAT
performance, but then all were provided with the same reimbursement. This difference should
not have impacted participant SAT performance, as remuneration was provided after the
completion of the task. However, participants were debriefed to determine whether this
deception had been successful. Eleven out of forty-six reported that they had definitely not fallen
for the deception, and three reported that they had questioned it but not reached a firm
conclusion. When asked why the deception had not worked, three participants reported that it
had been due to misunderstanding the recruitment call (which had stated the possibility of
receiving up to $20) to mean that participants would definitely receive $20. One stated that he
felt psychology “had a reputation” for deceiving people. Two reported that they did not think the
computer (an ordinary PC laptop) was capable of calculating a financial reward on the basis of
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reaction times. The remaining five were not able to provide a reason for the failure of the
deception, but reported feeling that they had “just figured it out,” or that “it didn’t seem right”.5
It is not clear what impact this difference had on SAT performance. It is unlikely that it
accounts for the failure to observe adaptive salience in the sample, as only a minority reported
that they hadn’t fallen for the deception, and of these, four spontaneously reported that they had
still put forth their best effort into the game as they had not felt the money to be important
(participants were not systematically asked whether they had put forth their best effort).
However, it is possible that the inability to genuinely yoke SAT performance to financial
reimbursement had some impact on participant engagement with the task in a way that impacted
performance.
One final consideration is worth examining when evaluating the absence of group
differences seen in the current sample; the nature of the measure by which the groups were
defined. During recruitment the PQ was deployed to distinguish a group that was meaningfully
“high” in sub-clinical psychotic experiences from a group that was meaningfully low in such
experiences. The cut score for a “low” group member was based on the mean number of
Distressing Attenuated Positive Psychotic Symptoms seen in the broader sample from which
these participants were drawn. However, the upper cut score (eight or more DAPPS to be
included in the “high” group) was derived from a diagnostic study which administered the
measure to a help-seeking sample attending a prodromal research clinic (Loewy et al. 2005).
Thus the current study may have failed to divide people into theoretically meaningful groups.

5

One of the participants who had questioned the deception but not reached a firm conclusion stated “I sort of
thought it was a deception, but then I didn’t think you would do that!”
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This study examined “high” vs. “low” scorers on a symptom measure administered to
non-help seeking college undergraduates. Such an approach is by now reasonably well
established within experimental psychopathology, and various different measures have been
deployed to explore the characteristics of delusion/hallucination “prone” individuals, or
individuals who experience attenuated symptomatology (e.g. Peters et. al, 2004, Freeman, 2006,
Sommer et al., 2010, Reeves et al., 2014). However, it is possible that it yields “high” and “at
risk” groups that are very different from clinical cases of psychosis. Additionally, there is likely
to be variation between “at risk” groups between studies, depending on what type of symptom
measure is used. Psychosis is a complex, multi-factorial phenomenon (Lincoln, 2007). To
suggest that the difference between clinically significant positive psychotic symptoms and
attenuated positive symptoms is only a matter of degree is to potentially misunderstand the
phenomena. Individuals with psychosis also exhibit a range of neurocognitive deficits, (Saykin et
al., 1994, Green, 1998, Choi et al., 2013), problems with social functioning (Dickerson et al.,
1999, Green, 2000) and experiences of subjective strangeness that do not readily fall into the
categories provided by mainstream descriptive psychiatry (see e.g., Sass, 1994, Sass and Parnas,
2003, Handest et al., 2015). The differences between an individual suffering from psychosis, and
one reporting statistically elevated levels of attenuated psychotic symptoms may extend beyond
the severity of the symptom present, making it difficult to draw reliable inferences about one by
studying the other. Accordingly, any results from a study with this population should be
interpreted cautiously.
5.5.1. Does the SAT measure salience attribution?
Apart from specific limitations of this study, a broader potential limitation of the SAT
became apparent over the course of data collection, which has implications for all studies which
have deployed the measure. Because this issue has broader ramifications than the present study,
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it will be discussed in some detail in the current section. The limitation in question pertains to the
assumption that the Salience Attribution Test is a valid measure of the construct of salience. In
this section I explore this assumption in the light of the present results and the rest of the extant
literature. I will suggest that there are potentially serious flaws in the assumption, and that this
leads to a need for further construct validation of the SAT in future research.
The SAT is a behavioral task which yields a series of reaction times and subjectivity
judgements. How these are derived (and their names; “implicit/explicit, adaptive/aberrant
salience”) is outlined in the method section above. The theory is that each of the four main
output variables pertain principally to salience attribution. However, an alternative interpretation
is available. The task involves responses to reward, so it is possible that it measures (or contains
interference from) a participant’s subjective sense of pleasure and motivation pertaining to that
reward, as opposed to the sense of significance the reward came to acquire. It is known that
patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia experience a range of motivational and hedonic
deficits, which have been implicated in social functioning (Foussias et al., 2009). Furthermore,
deficits in motivation have been shown to have a pervasive impact on cognitive task performance
(Summerfeldt et al., 1991, Fervaha et al., 2014). Research using the SAT in schizophrenia
patients is potentially vulnerable to misinterpretation. A closer examination of previous data
using the SAT with this population is consistent with the possibility that anhedonia could be a
confounding factor in interpreting its results. Both pleasure and salience processing have a wellestablished link to the mesolimbic dopamine system (Berridge & Robinson, 1998), so clarity
about which construct is being tested is critical for theoretical consistency.
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5.6. Future Directions
Our understanding of what distinguishes individuals at risk for psychosis from those who
have transitioned to full blown psychotic illness remains underdeveloped. Research examining
the factors which predict conversion has recently been criticized for small sample sizes and poor
methodological quality (Studerus et al., 2017). This is a field with substantial clinical
significance. Psychosis is traumatic, socially and economically deleterious to individuals who
experience it, and difficult to treat successfully. Preventing it depends partly on understanding
what distinguishes those who do and those who do not transition. Cognitive interventions have
targeted potential psychological mechanisms that may work to keep attenuated psychotic
symptoms from developing into full blown psychosis (Moritz and Woodward, 2007).
Understanding exactly which cognitive mechanisms distinguish those who do from those who
don’t transition can help to focus such interventions more precisely. Future work should continue
to examine the inter-relations between cognitive processes associated with attenuated psychotic
symptoms.
The current study is among the first to explore the distinction between two factors that
have been theoretically linked to psychosis, aberrant salience and incautious reasoning. It
remains a live question how distinct these really are, and some accounts of the Jumping to
Conclusions bias suggest that it is itself driven by salience processing (e.g. Speechley et al.,
2010). One way to approach this question would be to recruit non-psychotic groups defined by
cut-scores on the beads task (a jump to conclusions group, defined by a draw-to-decision score of
two or less, and a group who draw an average or above average quantity of beads) and
specifically compare them on various measures of saliency processing (including experimental
and self-report/phenomenology measures). Such an approach would be better able to establish
the extent of any overlap between salience processing and probabilistic reasoning, and rule out
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the potential confound of their independent correlations with psychotic phenomena.
Additionally, other characteristics of reasoning in such a specially recruited “jump to
conclusions” group could ascertain precisely how this reasoning style could contribute to
psychotic symptoms. Are healthy individuals who display the bias also prone to endorsing a
wider range of beliefs on an instrument like the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (Pechey and
Halligan, 2010)? Alternatively, do such individuals show deficits in other forms of reality testing
when compared with non-jump-to-conclusions participants?
The study of aberrant salience in psychosis remains underdeveloped, despite a significant
influence on the theoretical literature. The present discussion suggests some significant
limitations with the experimental approach to studying the phenomenon. However, self-reported
aberrant salience (as measured by the ASI) captures an aspect of subjective experience that is of
great importance to the theory. Two types of study could now significantly contribute to our
understanding of the role of aberrant salience in the onset and development of psychosis. First,
longitudinal self-report studies are required in order to discern whether experiences of aberrant
salience genuinely precede the onset of full-blown psychosis, and thus whether they seem to play
the role that has been theoretically assigned to them. Evidence that documented the onset of
subjective feelings of elevated salience prior to the emergence of symptoms, and demonstrated
an association between those experiences and symptoms, would lend stronger evidence to the
supposition that salience dysregulation is an important causal mechanism. Second, more detailed
studies are required to explore whether aberrant salience plays a role in all positive psychotic
symptoms (as predicted by Kapur, 2003) or more so in some than in others. In the growing
literature on specific psychotic symptoms, more weight is generally given to aberrant salience in
theories of delusion formation (see e.g. Gurin and Blum, 2017) than it is in theories of auditory
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hallucinations. Studies that compare groups with different sorts of positive psychotic symptoms
(hallucinations vs. delusions) could provide evidence that bears on the relative importance of this
experience in different symptomatic presentations.
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Appendix A:
Beads Task: Behavioral Observations:
In the current study, participants were observed during administration of the beads task,
providing some insight into how they approached it. This revealed the presence of some
idiosyncratic reasoning processes in participants’ approach to the task, which may have
implications for how the results from the beads task are interpreted. It appears to be a general
assumption that participants approach the task in an intuitive manner, without making
calculations, just waiting for the feeling that they have seen enough beads to decide. If this
assumption is incorrect, the reporting of the numeric “draws to decision” variable may not
provide a consistent picture of the reasoning style used by participants. In the rest of this section
I outline these apparent idiosyncrasies, and discuss their implications for the interpretation of the
beads task.
As expected, the modal style of reasoning on the beads task in current participants did
appear to be an attempt to get an imprecise, good enough sense of which of the two jars the
beads were coming from. Participants seemed to wait until they had an intuitive feeling that they
knew which jar was most likely. However, some participants approached the task in an
idiosyncratic way. One participant (who was recruited as a “high” participant, but who endorsed
only seven DAPPS on the day of the experiment) stopped the experimenter after hearing the
instructions and before the beads were shown. He reported that he could tell me in advance that
he would like to see eight beads on the 85:15 version and that he would decide after the eighth.
On the 60:40 version he reported that he would like to see ten beads and that he would decide
after that. Another participant (“high”; nine DAPPS) drew fewer beads than average in both
conditions (four on the 85:15 version and seven on the 60:40 version), but requested at the start
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of the procedure that the experimenter wait a moment as she would be able to work out how to
calculate it. She also responded to the verbal instruction “only decide when you are certain” by
saying “I’m never certain!”6 When the experimenter asked how she was calculating, she replied
that she was just trying to work it out, and did not mention a specific approach (e.g. applying
Bayes’ Theorem). These two (high scoring) individuals are reasoning unusually cautiously, but
the number of beads they draw (lower than average) does not reflect this. It is unclear whether
their reasoning style should be regarded as optimal (it is, after all, apparently informed by an
arithmetic approach) or obsessive and inefficient. Interpreted within the theoretical framework of
the two factor model, these participants’ behaviors on the beads task could be taken as indicative
of an exceptionally careful approach to reality testing. Such care could keep in check their
unusually high level of distressing attenuated psychotic experiences. Their cautious precision
may represent a coping style in the face of anomalous experiences, but this is not reflected in the
sheer number of beads they drew.
Other participant behaviors also suggested the need for caution in interpreting the results
of the beads task. One participant (“high”; endorsing nine DAPPS) may have misunderstood the
task, drawing the maximum amount of beads (20) on the 85:15 ratio. When queried about her
approach, she reported that she had been trying to wait until fifteen of one color had appeared
and beads of that kind stopped being drawn, at which point she could have been sure the jar was
mainly the other color. This approach seems to eschew the purely subjective feeling of certainty
that beads task participants are theoretically proposed to rely on, and might be viewed as a highly
cautious but hopelessly inefficient strategy. She drew 19 beads on the 60:40 version, and seemed

6

This verbal response also reveals the subjectivity of the instruction prompt. It is possible that this participant was
distracted by a demand for certainty, which may have felt impossible to her, and could have influenced how she
responded to the task.
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to rely on a subjective sense of probability rather than using the elimination strategy from the
85:15 version. With the 60:40 version, such a strategy would have required the viewing of 40
beads. A “low” participant (two DAPPS) drew only one bead before deciding on the 60:40
version (which she saw first) and then five on the 85:15 version. When asked about her approach
she reported that she had “just had a feeling” on the 60:40 version that the beads were coming
from the mainly blue jar, but in retrospect wished she had seen more. Such an individual might
be said to be “jumping to conclusions,” but her behavior became paradoxically more
conservative when presented with an easier version of the task. Her behavior on the 60:40
version may have represented a fleeting experience of certainty that did not generalize to the
other version, or it may have represented a failure to understand the task. These observations
were made by chance, and were not the result of a systematic exploration of how people
reasoned, but they nonetheless reveal a potential flaw in the assumptions that underlie the use of
the beads task to understand probabilistic reasoning.
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Appendix B: Results with alternative groupings

In the following appendix, data are presented on the two alternative groupings discussed
in the results section.
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of low/high participants by alternate groupings:
Grouping 2

Grouping 3

Total
Sample

Low

High

Low

High

Age Mean

21.4

19.8

21.5

20.17

20.5

(SD)

(4.03)

(2.14)

(4.19)

(2.27)

(3.33)

Male

10

14 (25)

(37.5)

11

24

n (%)

(17.85)

(45.8)

(42.85)

Female

19

13 (23.21

15

13

32

n (%)

(33.92)

)

(62.5)

(54.2)

(57.14)

Hispanic

6 (10.7)

15

3

14

21 (37.5)

(26.78)

(12.5)

(58.3)

5 (8.92)

10

5

16

(41.7)

(20.8)

(28.57)

5

2

10

(20.8)

(12.5)

(17.85)

6 (25)

2 (8.3)

9 (16.07)

n (%)
Asian

11

n (%)

(19.64)

Black

6 (10.7)

4 (7.14)

n (%)
Other

6 (10.7)

3 (5.37)

n (%)
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Table 2. Average Distressing Attenuated Positive Psychotic Symptoms in low/high by alternate
groupings:
Grouping 2 (PQ status at

Grouping 3 (Stable

experiment)

PQ status) (n=48)

(n=57)
High (n=30)

Total DAPPS

12.92 (3.62)

Low (n=27)

1.41 (1.5)

Total Positive

44.07

14.19

PQ

(20.74)

(14.47)

High

Low

(n=24)

(n=24)

12.29

1.16

(13.93)

(1.37)

43 (22.2)

12.58
(3.9)

B.1. Reaction times broken down by block and low/high classification, for each of the three
groupings:
In the following series of tables, descriptive SAT data is provided, broken down into
low/high group comparisons. The data is provided separately for each of the two alternate sets of
low/high groupings. For each grouping, three tables are included. In the first table, Mean and SD
reaction time data are provided for the low and the high group in Block 1, Block 2 and overall.
In the second table, these data are further broken down by the different types of stimulus
that participants responded to. Low and high validity stimuli refer to whether the stimuli were
predictive of a reward or not (i.e. “high validity” stimuli are predictive of a reward). Stimuli were
colored either red or blue, and were either animals or household objects. Out of these four
stimulus dimensions, one dimension (e.g. animals) would be rewarded; other stimuli (e.g.
household objects) would not be. The “task irrelevant” dimension of the stimulus was that aspect
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that was not predictive of the presence or absence of reward (in this example, color). The “taskirrelevant” reaction times refer to the average reaction time to the different levels of the task
irrelevant stimulus (RTs to red and blue objects). The terms “task irrelevant high” and “task
irrelevant low” refer to whichever color participants responded more quickly to.
In the third table estimates of salience attribution are extracted from the reaction time
data as follows. Subtracting High Validity reaction times from Low Validity reaction times at the
group level provides a measure of the extent of speeding to rewarded trials. Roiser et al. (2009)
term this differential “adaptive salience”. It is implicit because it is derived from a behavioral
measure. Subtracting reaction times to one form of task irrelevant stimulus (i.e. red animals on a
trial when blue stimuli are being rewarded) from reaction times to the other form of task
irrelevant stimulus yields a measure of aberrant salience. A totally rational participant in the SAT
would not demonstrate speeding toward one or the other level of the task-irrelevant stimulus. An
individual who assigns aberrant salience might be expected to show a pattern of speeding toward
stimuli that are not being rewarded. Implicit salience data for Grouping 1 are shown in Table X.
below.
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Grouping 2:
Table 3. Grouping 2 reaction time data by group and block
Low (n=25)

High (n=18)

Mean RT

SD

Mean RT

SD

Block 1

257.49

48.68

266.98

56.94

Block 2

265.51

57.98

255.43

42.79

Overall

261.50

51.92

261.20

48.99

Table 4. Grouping 2 reaction time data by group, block and stimulus validity
Low (n=25)

High (n=18)

Mean RT

SD

Mean RT

SD

Block 1 High Validity

259.37

48.42

263.60

56.90

Block 1 Low Validity

255.61

51.06

270.35

58.67

Block 2 High Validity

262.71

56.82

251.95

42.29

Block 2 Low Validity

268.32

64.19

258.91

45.56

Block 1 Irrelevant High 262.71

56.82

280.23

64.82

Block 1 Irrelevant Low

248.94

54.06

261.01

57.31

Block 2 Irrelevant High 269.10

77.79

263.71

51.35

Block 2 Irrelevant Low

262.68

57.49

261.31

52.31

Overall High Validity

261.04

50.77

257.78

48.33
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Overall Low Validity

261.97

54.90

264.63

51.02

Table 5. Grouping 2 implicit salience data by group and block

Block 1

Block 2

Low (n=25)

High (n=18)

Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms)

-3.75 (20.61)

6.74 (19.82)

Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms)

15.65 (34.07)

6.41 (43.87)

Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms)

5.61 (35.37)

6.95 (20.16)

Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms)

19.22 (35.55)

2.39 (48.58)
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Grouping 3:
Table 6. Grouping 3 reaction time data by group and block
Low (n=22)

High (n=15)

Mean RT

SD

Mean RT

SD

Block 1

251.30

48.64

253.96

41.92

Block 2

258.61

56.84

249.07

36.76

Overall

254.95

51.60

251.51

38.59

Table 7. Grouping 3 reaction time data by group, block and stimulus validity
Low (n=22)

High (n=15)

Mean RT

SD

Mean RT

SD

Block 1 High Validity

253.28

48.44

250.7

43.36

Block 1 Low Validity

249.32

51.10

257.22

43.09

Block 2 High Validity

254.23

54.16

244.17

36.39

Block 2 Low Validity

262.99

63.5

253.97

38.39

Block 1 Irrelevant High 259.29

56.85

266.32

51.37

Block 1 Irrelevant Low

241.69

52.92

250.04

41.44

Block 2 Irrelevant High 260.51

75.46

256.54

38.21

Block 2 Irrelevant Low

259.80

57.98

251.01

49.36

Overall High Validity

253.75

49.63

247.43

40.64

Overall Low Validity

256.16

54.85

255.6

41.92
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Table 8. Grouping 3 implicit salience data by group and block

Block 1

Block 2

Low (n=22)

High (n=15)

Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms)

-3.95 (21.26)

6.5 (21.08)

Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms)

17.60 (34.59)

16.27 (34.7)

Implicit Adaptive Salience (ms)

8.76 (31.74)

9.8 (19.86)

Implicit Aberrant Salience (ms)

0.7 (43.3)

5.5 (39.52)
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B.2. SAT VAS Rating data:

In addition to reacting with a key press across 128 trials, participants are asked, at the end
of each block of 64 trials, to provide a subjective probability rating on a Visual Analogue Scale
(VAS) of how often they were received money for different types of stimuli
(red/blue/animal/household object). Average VAS ratings for each group are presented in the
tables below.
Grouping 2:
Table 9. Grouping 2 VAS rating and explicit salience data by group, block and stimulus validity

Block 1

Block 2

Low (n=25)

High (n=18)

VAS High Probability

62.40 (16.88)

68.89 (11.06)

VAS Low Probability

26.40 (16.81)

28.44 (22.137)

VAS irrelevant “high”

57.16 (14.12)

51.39 (11.40)

VAS irrelevant “low”

45.80 (16.75)

46.44 (15.05)

Explicit Adaptive Salience (%)

36 (28)

40.44 (28.76)

Explicit Aberrant Salience (%)

11.36 (18.76)

4.94 (24.62)

VAS High Probability

63.63 (18.05)

65.89 (14.01)

VAS Low Probability

33.64 (20.18)

40.06 (13.22)

VAS irrelevant “high”

38.96 (18.49)

37.11 (17.99)

VAS irrelevant “low”

49.24 (19.13)

62.72 (10.02)

Explicit Adaptive Salience (%)

30 (35.53)

25.83 (22.54)

Explicit Aberrant Salience (%)

10.28 (27.70)

25.61 (25.61)
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Grouping 3:
Table 10. Grouping 3 VAS rating and explicit salience data by group, block and stimulus validity

Block 1

Block 2

Low (n=22)

High (n=15)

VAS High Probability

60.59 (16.9)

69.2 (10.7)

VAS Low Probability

27.14 (17.57)

30.73 (23.6)

VAS irrelevant “high”

57.64 (14.85)

50.8 (12.06)

VAS irrelevant “low”

44.55 (16.97)

48.73 (14.84)

Explicit Adaptive Salience (%)

33.45 (28.61)

38.46 (30.34)

Explicit Aberrant Salience (%)

18.9 (11.94)

17 (17.97)

VAS High Probability

62.91 (18.78)

66.8 (14.63)

VAS Low Probability

33.41 (20.44)

40.87 (13.67)

VAS irrelevant “high”

51.18 (18.1)

62.93 (9.64)

VAS irrelevant “low”

37.7 (18.25)

38.2 (18.52)

Explicit Adaptive Salience (%)

29.5 (36.45)

25.93 (24)

Explicit Aberrant Salience (%)

22.13 (22.13)

27.8 (22.69)
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B.3. ANOVAs:

Grouping 2 & 3:
To explore differences between the task-irrelevant levels of the stimulus over time (i.e.
changes in aberrant salience), reaction time data were entered into a mixed ANOVA model, with
Block (1 vs. 2) and Mean RT to the two levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus (High vs, Low) as
within subjects factors, and group as the between subjects factor. There were no main effects and
no interactions.
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B.4. Self Report Aberrant Salience Data:
56 participants completed the Aberrant Salience Inventory, data for three participants was
incomplete or lost. Group means for the remaining 53 participants are presented in table 3.,
organized into the three different PQ groupings.
Table 11: Self-Report Aberrant Salience Data by group:
Grouping 2: PQ

Grouping 3:

status at time of

Longitudinal PQ

experiment

status

High

Low

High

Low

(n=25)

(n=29)

(n=22)

(n=24)

ASI mean

17.04

11.45

18.27

9.79 (5.9)

(sd)

(6.4)

(7.6)

(5.9)
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B.5. Probabilistic Reasoning Data:
62 participants completed the probabilistic reasoning (beads) task. The outcome for this
task was the number of beads drawn before participants felt certain they knew which jar the
beads were coming from. Mean draws to decision for each group are presented in table 23. The
distributions of these draws to decisions are presented in graphs 1 and 2.
Table 12. Mean Draws to Decision (DTD) for “high” and “low” groups, across three
groupings:
Grouping 2: PQ
status at time of
experiment

Grouping 3:
Longitudinal PQ
status (n=48)

(n=57)
High
(n=27)

Low
(n=30)

High
(n=24)

Low
(n=24)

85:15
mean
6.81 (4.1)
DTD (sd)

6.27
(3.75)

7.33
(4.23)

6.08
(3.75)

60:40
mean
10.3 (4.2)
DTD (sd)

9.40 (3.7)

10.75
(4.19)

9.29
(4.07)
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B.6. Group differences:
To assess for DAPPS high vs low group differences on the test variables, multiple
independent t-tests were conducted to compare group (high vs. low) means for VAS adaptive
salience block 1, VAS adaptive salience block 2, VAS aberrant salience block 1, VAS aberrant
salience block 2 the ASI, the 85:15 version of the beads task and the 60:40 version of the beads
task. A Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple (7) comparisons, so that the threshold for
a significant finding was a p-value of 0.007. Results of multiple comparisons for Groupings two
and three are shown in tables 13 and 14, below.
Table 13-Grouping 2: Multiple t-tests of group mean differences on five test variables:
Variable

t-value

p-value

ASI Mean score

2.87 (df=41)

0.006*

Beads (85:15)

0.52 (df=55)

0.60

Beads (60:40)

1.84 (df=55)

0.40

VAS adaptive Salience B1

0.50 (df=41)

0.61

VAS aberrant Salience B1

0.22 (df=41)

0.82

VAS adaptive Salience B2

0.43 (df=41)

0.66

VAS aberrant Salience B2

1.31 (df=41)

0.19

*=significant at p=0.007.
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Table 14-Grouping 3: Multiple t-tests of group mean differences on five test variables:
Variable

t-value

p-value

ASI Mean score

4.83 (df=44)

<0.001*

Beads (85:15)

1.08 (df=46)

0.28

Beads (60:40)

1.22 (df=46)

0.22

VAS adaptive Salience B1

0.51 (df=35)

0.61

VAS aberrant Salience B1

0.38 (df=35)

0.70

VAS adaptive Salience B2

0.33 (df=35)

0.74

VAS aberrant Salience B2

1.28 (df=35)

0.20

*=significant at p=0.007.
In both groupings, the only significant difference between groups was on mean total ASI
score, suggesting that the groups here did not differ in terms of their draws to decision
performance or their aberrant salience attribution during a probabilistic learning task.
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B.7.Logistic Regressions:
To test for the possibility that probabilistic reasoning moderates the association between
aberrant salience and DAPPS, logistic regression analyses were completed for Groupings two
and three, using ASI aberrant salience and draws to decision for the two different versions of the
beads task as predictors. Self-reported experiences of aberrant salience were associated with
increased odds of belonging to the “high” DAPPS group, confirming the first hypothesis of the
present study. Draws to decision was not reliably associated with increased odds of belonging to
the high DAPPS group for either version of the beads task. To examine the interaction between
aberrant salience and performance on the beads task, a third variable was computed to represent
the multiplicative term of aberrant salience and draws to decision on the beads task. The
interaction for both models was non-significant, suggesting that performance on the beads task
does not moderate the relationship between aberrant salience and DAPPS.
Table 16-Grouping 2 Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant
Salience (ASI) and 85:15 Beads Task results:
OR

95% CI

b (SE)

P

Aberrant Salience (ASI)

1.13

1.02-1.24

0.12 (0.5)

0.01*

Beads 85:15

1.17

0.62-2.11

0.14 (1.6)

0.92

Table 176-Grouping 2 Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant
Salience (ASI) and 60:40 Beads Task results:
OR

95% CI

b (SE)

P

Aberrant Salience (ASI) 1.123

1.02-1.23

0.17 (0.5)

0.01*

Beads 60:40

0.00

-19.85 (0.)

1.00

0.00
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Table 187-Grouping 3 Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant
Salience (ASI) and 85:15 Beads Task results:
OR

95% CI

b (SE)

P

Aberrant Salience (ASI)

1.21

1.06-1.38

0.19 (0.69)

0.05*

Beads 85:15

1.09

0.18-65.04

0.09 (2.08)

0.96

Table 198-Grouping 3 Logistic regression predicting High/Low DAPPS status using Aberrant
Salience (ASI) and 60:40 Beads Task results:
OR

95% CI

b (SE)

P

Aberrant Salience (ASI)

1.12

1.05-1.28

0.19 (0.69)

<0.01*

Beads 60:40

0.00

0.00

19.16 (>100)

0.00
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Appendix C: Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ):
Indicate how often you have had the following thoughts, feelings and experiences on average, in the
last month, by choosing the appropriate answer on the scale for each item. Do not include
experiences while using alcohol, drugs or medications.
For any item response greater than 0, please indicate if that experience has been distressing to you.
Please answer all of the questions, and if you are unsure, choose the answer that you think is best.
Indicate that you have read the above instructions: Yes or No
For each Question choose one of the following answers: 0-----1-2 times-----once/week-----few
Times/week-----daily and distress Yes/NO

Question
In the last month:
i. Indicate that you have read the above instructions: Yes or No
1. I have been distracted by noises or other people talking.
2. The passage of time has felt unnaturally faster or slower than usual.
3. I have had difficulty organizing my thoughts or finding the right words.
4. When I looked at a person or at myself in a mirror, I have seen the face change right before
my eyes.
5. I have noticed strange feelings on or just beneath my skin, like bugs crawling.
6. I have not gotten along well with people at school or at work.
7. Previously familiar surroundings have seemed strange, confusing, threatening or unreal.
8. I seemed to live through events exactly as they happened before (déjà vu).
9. I have smelled or tasted things that other people didn't notice.
10. I have had difficulty concentrating, listening or reading.
11. I have had troubles at school or work.
12. I have thought that other people could read my mind.
13. I have heard things other people couldn't hear like voices of people whispering or talking.
14. I have had difficulty expressing my feelings as well as I used to.
15. I have had difficulty expressing my feelings as well as I used to.
16. I have noticed a sense of not knowing who I am.
17. I have noticed that I am less interested than I used to be in keeping clean or dressing well.
18. I have heard unusual sounds like banging, clicking, hissing, clapping or ringing in my ears.
19. I have mistaken shadows for people or noises for voices.
20. Things have appeared different from the way they usually do (brighter or duller, larger or
smaller, or changed in some other way).
21. I have been very quiet and have kept in the background on social occasions.
22. People have stared at me because of my odd appearance.
23. I have wandered off the topic or rambled on too much when I was speaking.
24. I have had experiences with telepathy, psychic forces, or fortune-telling.
25. I have thought that other people had it in for me.
26. My sense of smell has seemed unusually strong.
27. I have felt that I was not in control of my own ideas or thoughts.
28. I have felt unhappy or depressed.
29. Everyday things have affected me more than they used to.
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30. I have thought that I am very important or have abilities that are out of the ordinary.
31. Other people have thought that I was a little strange.
32. My thoughts have seemed to be broadcast out loud so that other people knew what I was
thinking.
33. I have had nothing to say or very little to say.
34. I have felt unusually sensitive to noise.
35. I have had superstitious thoughts.
36. I have heard my own thoughts as if they were outside of my head.
37. I have had trouble focusing on one thought at a time.
38. I have felt that other people were watching me or talking about me.
39. I have gotten very nervous when I had to make polite conversation.
40. People have commented on my unusual mannerisms and habits.
41. I have been less interested in school or work.
42. I have found it hard to be emotionally close to other people.
43. I have avoided social activities with other people.
44. I have felt very guilty.
45. I have thought that I am an odd, unusual person.
46. I have thought that things I saw on the TV or read in the newspaper had a special meaning
for me.
47. My moods have been highly changeable and unstable.
48. I have felt unable to enjoy things that I used to enjoy.
49. My thinking has felt confused, muddled, or disturbed in some way.
50. I have felt suddenly distracted by distant sounds that I am not normally aware of.
51. I have been talking to myself.
52. I have had the sense that some person or force was around me, even though I could not see
anyone.
53. I have been in danger of failing out of school, or of being fired from my job.
54. I have engaged in some eccentric (odd) habits.
55. I have been worried that something may be wrong with my mind.
56. I have felt that I didn't exist, the world didn't exist, or that I was dead.
57. I have been confused whether something I experienced was real or imaginary.
58. People have found me to be aloof and distant.
59. I have tended to keep my feelings to myself.
60. I have experienced unusual bodily sensations such as tingling, pulling, pressure, aches,
burning, cold, numbness, shooting pains, vibrations or electricity.
61. I have thought about beliefs that other people would find unusual or bizarre.
62. People have said that my ideas were strange or illogical.
63. I have felt worthless.
64. I have felt that parts of my body had changed in some way, or that parts of my body were
working differently than before.
65. My thoughts have been so strong that I could almost hear them.
66. I have not been very good at returning social courtesies and gestures.
67. I have seen special meanings in advertisements, shop windows, or in the way things were
arranged around me.
68. I have picked up hidden threats or put-downs from what people said or did.
69. I have used words in unusual ways.
107

70. I have felt angry, easily irritated or offended.
71. I have felt like I was looking at myself as in a movie, or that I was a spectator in my own life.
72. I have been less able to do usual activities or tasks.
73. I have not been sleeping well.
74. I have felt that some person or force interfered with my thinking or put thoughts into my
head.
75. I have had experiences with the supernatural, astrology, seeing the future or UFOs.
76. People have dropped hints about me or said things with a double meaning.
77. I have been concerned that my closest friends and co-workers were not really loyal or
trustworthy.
78. I have had little interest in getting to know other people.
79. I have seen unusual things like flashes, flames, blinding light or geometric figures.
80. I have been extremely anxious when meeting people for the first time.
81. I have felt like I was at a distance from myself, as if I were outside my own body or that a
part of my body did not belong to me.
82. I have found that when something sad happened, I was no longer able to feel sadness, or
when something joyful happened, I could not feel happy.
83. I have been crying.
84. I have seen things that other people apparently couldn't see.
85. I have felt unable to carry out everyday tasks because of fatigue or lack of motivation.
86. Everyday things have been more stressful than before, like school or work, social situations,
deadlines or changes in a schedule.
87. I have avoided going to places where there were many people because I get anxious.
88. I have felt more nervous or anxious, and have found it hard to relax.
89. I have felt uninterested in the things I used to enjoy.
90. People have found it hard to understand what I say.
91. I have had trouble remembering things.
92. People have said that I seemed 'spacey' or 'out of it.'
93. I have felt like I had lost my sense of myself or felt disconnected from my life.
94. I have felt afraid.
95. In the past month I have received counseling or mental health services, or sought out help for
emotional/psychological difficulties.
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